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Recent debates about immigration have focused 
overwhelmingly on unauthorized migration and the respective 
roles of the federal and state governments in enforcing 
immigration law. But that emphasis in law and theory has 
obscured a critical civil rights question of our time: what measure 
of equality is due to those with the opportunity to abide by the 
rules of entry, who are now lawfully present within the United 
States? 
Although the United States Supreme Court recognized 
decades ago that lawfully present migrants are a discrete and 
insular minority entitled to heightened judicial protection under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in 
recent years, a body of little-analyzed federal and state court 
decisions has eroded that longstanding precedent, elevating 
deference to the federal government’s power to set immigration 
policy over a previously established constitutional commitment to 
immigrants’ equal treatment by the states. This Article critically 
explores this development and argues that although federalism 
may legitimately serve as a lens through which to gauge arbitrary 
discrimination, federalism principles should not stealthily serve 
as a preemption-like doctrine beneath the surface in equal 
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protection cases. To reign in federalism’s potentially disruptive 
impact on immigrants’ rights, this Article argues that courts 
should consider federalism principles only as an interpretative 
tool in equal protection cases involving migrants and recommit to 
immigrants’ long settled right to equal treatment by the states. 
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I. Introduction 
For most migrants, the path of legal entry into the United 
States represents a golden door of opportunity.1 But legal entry 
does not guarantee equal treatment. Louisiana, for example, bars 
lawfully present migrants with valid visas from taking the bar 
exam2 and excludes lawfully present noncitizens classified as 
non-immigrants3 from working as licensed nurses.4 In Tennessee, 
certain lawfully present migrants are ineligible for drivers’ 
licenses.5 Meanwhile, Connecticut, Colorado, Maine, and 
Washington, among other states, deny lawful permanent 
residents equivalent state-funded healthcare benefits provided to 
citizens.6 Courts have sanctioned this dissimilar treatment in the 
face of equal protection challenges, in spite of the United States 
                                                                                                     
 1. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 3 (2004) (describing the 
“golden doorway of admission to the United States” and various efforts to 
narrow it). 
 2. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 410–21 (5th Cir. 2005) (denying an 
equal protection challenge to a Louisiana Supreme Court rule that restricted 
bar admission to citizens and lawful permanent residents). 
  3. Under immigration law, nonimmigrants are persons “admitted to the 
United States only for the duration of their status, and on the express condition 
they have ‘no intention of abandoning’ their countries of origin and do not intend 
to seek permanent residence in the United States.” Id. at 418–19. But, while 
“nonimmigrants must indicate an intent not to remain permanently in the 
United States” as a condition of their visa, they may lawfully express a 
simultaneous “intent to remain permanently (when they apply for LPR status).” 
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 77–78 (2d. Cir. 2012) (describing this dual 
intent doctrine). 
 4. See Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 57–61 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to Louisiana law that restricted nursing 
licenses to citizens and lawful permanent residents). 
 5. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 535 
(2007) (upholding a Tennessee law excluding lawfully present migrants with 
temporary status from obtaining drivers’ licenses). A number of states, however, 
have recently expanded access to drivers’ licenses to migrants regardless of their 
immigration status. See State Laws Providing Access to Driver’s Licenses or 
Cards, Regardless of Immigration Status, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/drivers-license-access-table.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2016) (summarizing states’ laws that permit drivers 
licenses to be obtained by immigrants) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 6. See infra Part III (discussing the cases that examined this issue). 
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Supreme Court’s holding more than forty years ago in Graham v. 
Richardson7 that migrants who are lawfully present in the 
United States are a discrete and insular minority entitled to 
heightened judicial protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
For the migrants recently denied an equal share of their state’s 
resources and economic opportunities, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal treatment has proven hollow; 
the courts that have upheld laws imposing unequal burdens on 
lawfully present migrants have done so under deferential rational 
basis scrutiny.8  
This disconnect between Graham’s promise of equality and 
the discrimination experienced by lawfully present noncitizens 
has escaped the critical analysis it deserves. In recent years, both 
the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressed to 
immigrants’ treatment by the states9 and an extensive scholarly 
literature have focused heavily on immigration federalism; that 
is, the extent to which the states and federal government share 
power to regulate migrants in ways traditionally 
unacknowledged.10 This emphasis in law and theory on the 
structural relationship between federal and state power to 
regulate immigrants has overshadowed an essential dialogue 
regarding immigrants’ rights.11 More specifically, it has obscured 
                                                                                                     
 7. 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). 
 8. See, e.g., LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 420 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[R]ational 
basis review must be the appropriate standard for evaluating state law 
classifications affecting nonimmigrant aliens.”); Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 
1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding Colorado’s alienage-based denial of 
healthcare benefits to lawful permanent residents under a deferential rational 
basis scrutiny). 
 9. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497 (2012) (examining 
whether federal law preempted an Arizona statute); Chamber of Commerce v. 
Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 593–94 (2011) (same).  
 10. See generally Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Kerry Abrams, Plenary 
Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 (2013); Stella Burch Elias, The New 
Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, The 
Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 
(2012); Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 341 (2008); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of 
Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 796 (2008). 
 11. See Huntington, supra note 10, at 838 (acknowledging that “[a] focus on 
federalism in the immigration context should not displace concern for individual 
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the fact that for lawfully present migrants, a group formally 
entitled to protection as a suspect class12 and long assumed to 
enjoy community membership similar to citizens, class-based 
discrimination persists with the sanction of deferential courts. In 
recent years, a body of little-analyzed federal and state court 
precedent has eroded Graham, elevating deference to the federal 
government’s power to set immigration policy over a previously 
established constitutional commitment to immigrants’ equal 
treatment by the states.13  
This Article critiques this development, which if left 
unchanged, will effectively preempt equal protection for 
immigrants.14 It argues for fulfillment of Graham’s essential 
                                                                                                     
rights” and that the difficult and important question regarding the status of 
judicial review when states regulate immigrants requires “greater debate and 
exploration”). Other scholars have critiqued the dwindling focus in law and 
theory on immigrant rights. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil 
Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 
611–12 (2012) (“Despite the fact that immigration and immigration enforcement 
directly and indirectly raise civil rights concerns, the legal analysis and the 
public discourse often ignores, or at least obscures, the direct civil rights 
impacts of U.S. immigration law and its enforcement.”); Geoffrey Heeren, 
Persons Who Are Not the People: The Changing Rights of Immigrants in the 
United States, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 367, 369–70 (2013) (discussing 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), and noting that in earlier eras, 
the Supreme Court “might have concerned itself more closely with the questions 
of individual rights” raised by challengers and critics of the law than “structural 
questions”); Raquel Aldana, On Rights, Federal Citizenship, and the “Alien,” 46 
WASHBURN L.J. 263, 290 (2007) (“[I]mmigrant advocates must grapple with an 
increasingly limited number of viable legal strategies to challenge anti-alienage 
measures in the courts.”). 
 12. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (applying strict 
scrutiny and overturning state laws that denied lawfully present migrants 
public benefits). 
 13. See infra Part III (examining this body of cases in detail). 
 14. Only a few commentators have challenged congressional power to 
sanction state discrimination on the basis of alienage status, and they have done 
so with varied depths of treatment. See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten 
Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harassment, and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 45 (2013) 
(arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1870’s policy of ensuring immigrants’ 
equality should be given effect in any immigration preemption analysis, but 
noting that, in contrast, “[f]ederal disfavor or disability does not authorize state 
discrimination”). In a critique of provisions of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) that “permitted federal and state governments to 
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mandate that states treat lawfully present immigrants equally, 
irrespective of the vagaries of federal immigration policy. In 
taking aim at the recent rise of federalism concerns in equal 
protection doctrine involving alienage status,15 this Article 
ultimately seeks to answer a broader normative question that 
both the Supreme Court and commentators alike, both before and 
after Graham, have never resolved: What role, if any, should 
federalism—specifically, the supremacy of federal immigration 
policy—play in determining states’ equal protection obligations to 
lawfully present noncitizens?  
                                                                                                     
exclude certain aliens from welfare and other benefits,” Gilbert Paul Carrasco 
argued that Congress could not immunize the states from the requirements of 
equal protection, which he described as “inverse preemption.” See Gilbert Paul 
Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the Galaxy 
of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REV. 591, 617–18 (1994) (“[T]he primacy granted 
federal statutes by the Supremacy Clause, while authorizing Congress to occupy 
a field and preclude state legislation on specific subjects, does not permit the 
licensing of state action that violates the Constitution.”). Not long after its 
enactment, Michael Wishnie examined the 1996 Welfare Reform Act—which, 
similar to IRCA, sanctions states’ alienage-based denials of public benefits. 
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration 
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 497–98 (2001) 
(analyzing the Act through the lens of whether Congress has the power to 
delegate its immigration lawmaking authority to the states); see also infra Part 
I.B (critically discussing Wishnie’s argument). Some might suggest that this 
Article’s description of federalism’s role as “preempting equal protection” is a 
poor fit because, unlike preemption, the influence of congressional policy on 
equal protection doctrine in the cases described would sanction state measures, 
not invalidate them. But this Article’s description aims to instead capture the 
ways in which the supremacy of federal law, just like in traditional preemption, 
nullifies another source of law, here: equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 15. This Article’s critique concerns the equal protection rights of lawfully 
present migrants, who under Supreme Court precedent are entitled to 
protection as a suspect class. It does not make additional claims regarding the 
rights of undocumented migrants. The United States Supreme Court in Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) held that undocumented migrants are not a suspect 
class entitled to the same equal protection scrutiny or solicitude as lawful 
immigrants, even as it then went on to strike down Texas’s exclusion of 
undocumented children from a free public education under an intermediate 
scrutiny. The normative question of whether a state’s equal protection 
obligations ought to be modulated when a regulation affects undocumented 
immigrants is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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The answer matters, for it will determine the extent to which 
equality under the Constitution is contingent upon congressional 
policy, and invariably majoritarian politics. For migrants, who 
are categorically excluded from the political process, much is at 
stake: employment and professional opportunities, healthcare 
benefits, drivers’ licenses, and a sense of membership and 
belonging in their communities.16  
To be sure, federalism has long figured importantly in equal 
protection doctrine involving immigrants.17 In fact, the Supreme 
Court has reinforced the principle that the federal government 
has exclusive responsibility for the regulation of immigration, as 
much through its equal protection jurisprudence as it has 
through preemption decisions.18 The Court presumes that the 
federal government acts reasonably when it draws distinctions 
between noncitizens and citizens because of the federal 
government’s plenary authority over immigration matters 
grounded in its exclusive foreign affairs power.19 Conversely, 
states lack authority to regulate immigration, and the Court has 
closely scrutinized state laws to smoke out improper motives for 
alienage-based distinctions in order to ensure equal treatment.20  
                                                                                                     
 16. See infra Part IV (examining the body of state and federal court 
decisions addressing these issues).  
 17. See infra Part III (examining the role of federalism in Supreme Court’s 
alienage jurisprudence). 
 18. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84–85 (1976) (distinguishing 
Graham’s equal protection analysis for state laws from federal ones, noting that 
“it is the business of the political branches of the Federal Government, rather 
than that of either the States or the Federal Judiciary, to regulate the 
conditions of entry and residence of aliens”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 
(1982) (reasoning that “[t]he States enjoy no power with respect to the 
classification of aliens. This power is committed to the political branches of the 
Federal Government.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)); 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (striking down a 
California law that restricted fishing licenses to noncitizens as a violation of 
equal protection after an extended discussion of exclusive federal authority to 
regulate immigrants and the conditions of their entry). 
 19. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 85 (“[A] division by a State of the category of 
persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of United States 
citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable 
classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate 
part of its business.”). 
 20. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971); see also Plyler, 457 
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Although this interplay between federalism and equality has 
long existed in the equal protection jurisprudence involving 
immigrants, in the recent cases critiqued in this Article, federal 
immigration policy has played a more disruptive role, 
transforming equal protection doctrine involving state alienage 
classifications into a preemption-like inquiry that privileges 
congressional policy choices.21 The preempting of equal protection 
in this context also alters the form of constitutional review. That 
is, in many of the recent cases upholding state alienage 
classifications, courts have incorporated legal considerations into 
their equal protection analysis that are more readily associated 
with preemption doctrine.  
For example, courts assessing equal protection challenges by 
immigrants have considered whether state restrictions mirror 
federal objectives, correspond to an identifiable congressional 
policy, and operate “harmoniously within the federal program.”22 
                                                                                                     
U.S. at 216 n.14 (explaining the “treatment of certain classifications as suspect” 
and noting that “[s]ome classifications are more likely than others to reflect 
deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some 
legitimate objective”). 
 21. Some have argued, however, that the Court’s earlier equal protection 
decisions in this area were, in fact, preemption cases masquerading as equal 
protection decisions. See Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A 
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060–65 (1979) 
(“Conceptualizing constitutional doctrine regarding alienage-based 
classifications in terms of the supremacy rather than the equal protection clause 
explains . . . the Court’s differential treatment of state and federal lines drawn 
on the basis of alienage, which would otherwise be an anomaly in equal 
protection doctrine.”); David F. Levi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: 
Preemption or Equal Protection? 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 1070 (1979) (arguing 
that the Court’s decisions involving alienage classifications in the 1970s 
followed “an unarticulated theory of preemption,” premised upon the notion that 
the states may not interfere with federal regulation of immigrants by altering, 
for those whom the federal government has admitted, “the terms of immigration 
with new burdens”). In Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 11 n.16 (1982), a case 
challenging a state-alienage classification, the Court noted this commentary, 
sidestepped the equal protection question altogether, and decided the case on 
the basis of preemption.  
 22. See, e.g., Guaman v. Velez, 421 N.J. Super. 239, 266–67 (App. Div. 
2011) (denying a preliminary injunction in equal protection challenge to 
alienage-based denial of state-funded healthcare benefits, reasoning, in part, 
that the law “mirrors federal objectives, corresponds to an identifiable 
congressional policy, and operates harmoniously within the federal program” 
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These considerations naturally shift the focus of equal protection 
inquiry from the justification for states’ discrimination, to 
whether Congress objects or is supportive of the states’ 
treatment.23  
Further, by eschewing the heightened judicial skepticism 
mandated by Graham and its progeny in state alienage cases, 
and, in its place, reviewing discriminatory laws with a deference 
formerly reserved for the federal government’s immigration 
regulations, courts are collapsing what has long existed as a 
dichotomous equal protection framework in cases involving 
alienage status.24 Unlike other areas of equal protection scrutiny 
where the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been deemed 
coextensive, since 1975, federal and state laws that classify on 
the basis of alienage status have been treated differently for 
equal protection purposes.25 Federal laws receive deferential 
rational basis review because of the federal government’s plenary 
                                                                                                     
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 221 N.J. 213 (2015) (per 
curiam); Cid v. S.D. Dep’t of Social Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887, 892 (S.D. 1999) 
(resolving an equal protection claim by reasoning that South Dakota had not 
“adopted any rule or legislation that is in conflict with national policies 
regarding alienage, or that places any burdens, other than those contemplated 
in the federal law, on those subject to its provisions”).  
 23. This recent emphasis on federalism over rights may be emblematic of 
broader tendency in immigration law and discourse. As Kevin Johnson has 
observed, immigration debates are “often couched in . . . federalism-styled 
arguments,” obscuring that “the core of the public debate over immigration 
enforcement concerns the rights of people and how they will be treated by 
government.” Johnson, supra note 11, at 638. 
 24. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976) (“[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially different from the 
constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over immigration and 
naturalization.”); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (noting a different “relationship between aliens and the States rather 
than between aliens and the Federal Government”); City of Chi. v. Shalala, 189 
F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he deference owed to Congress in matters of 
aliens’ status within its borders does not apply to state classification of aliens”), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1036 (2000). 
 25. See Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 158 (2014) (noting that in spite of the settled principle of 
congruence requiring that equal protection be interpreted the same way when 
applied to federal and state action, alienage discrimination is “one bastion” 
where “noncongruence still remains, sometimes unnoticed, within equal 
protection doctrine”). 
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authority over immigration matters,26 while courts have 
traditionally treated state laws employing the same or similar 
distinctions as suspect classifications that must meet the 
demands of strict scrutiny.27  
But recently, this non-congruence is disappearing from equal 
protection doctrine in the realm of immigrants’ rights as courts 
synchronize their analysis of federal and state alienage 
classifications—a largely under-theorized development.28 Last 
year, divided panels of the First and the Ninth Circuits29 followed 
                                                                                                     
 26. Mathews, 426 U.S. at 86–87. 
 27. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971).  
 28. Indeed, recent accounts of equal protection doctrine involving 
immigrants assume an ongoing—and some argue incoherent—non-congruence. 
See Soucek, supra note 25, at 159 (arguing that not only has the Court applied 
more heightened scrutiny to state cases than federal cases, but also that the 
nature of that scrutiny has varied); Cox, supra note 10, at 352 (arguing that 
“[c]ourts have struggled for decades to develop a coherent approach to 
evaluating alienage rules” and have “for the most part . . . failed: in some cases 
courts have suggested that alienage classifications are suspect and trigger 
heightened scrutiny, but in other cases courts have suggested that some 
alienage restrictions are due great judicial deference”). Clare Huntington has 
noted that growing recognition of “immigration federalism”—that is, acceptance 
of some measure of shared power between federal and state governments with 
respect to the regulation of immigrants—likely means an end to non-congruent 
equal protection in the immigration context, but acknowledges that what that 
means for individual rights has not yet been explored. See Huntington, supra 
note 10, at 838 (“The sharing of immigration authority among levels of 
government arguably calls for the unification of this standard, although it is not 
necessarily clear what such unification would look like.”). Earlier scholarship 
argued that the congruence principle in equal protection doctrine established in 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) warrants strict 
scrutiny of “federal alienage classifications in the same manner as state 
classifications in the realm of alienage law and fundamental rights.” Victor C. 
Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review 
of Federal Alienage Classifications After Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 
OR. L. REV. 425, 452 (1997). But this scholarship never contemplated what is 
currently occurring in the doctrine: a collapsing of the different tiers of scrutiny 
toward a relaxed and unified standard for both federal and state alienage 
classifications. Id. 
 29. See Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[W]e therefore 
conclude that if Maine can be said to have ‘discriminated’ at all, it only did so on 
the basis of federal Medicaid eligibility, a benign classification subject to mere 
rational basis review.”); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 887 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(finding rational basis review applies when the state was “merely following the 
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a 2004 decision by the Tenth Circuit30 and upheld state denials of 
public benefits to noncitizens after applying rational basis review. 
The state courts are split: some have followed the federal courts 
or adopted similar approaches,31 while others have adhered to 
Graham and struck down denials of public benefits to immigrants 
as violations of equal protection after applying strict scrutiny.32 
In addressing this developing, though not inevitable, collapse 
of the dichotomized approach to equal protection involving state 
and federal legislation classifying on the basis of alienage status, 
this Article seeks to clarify the appropriate role that federalism 
should play in equal protection doctrine33—as an interpretive tool 
to gauge presumptively acceptable justifications for 
distinguishing on the basis of migrants’ immigration status or as 
a lens through which to identify arbitrary governmental 
discrimination, but not as a preemption-like doctrine that makes 
the validity of state laws contingent upon congressional policy 
choices.34  
Part II establishes Graham’s theory of equality for 
immigrants and its disconnect with the recent lower court 
developments. Part III theorizes the ways in which federalism 
concerns might matter to states’ equal protection obligations to 
lawfully present immigrants and examines the influence of these 
various accounts on the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence. Here, the Article shows that in contrast to the 
recent trend, in previous periods, the Supreme Court emphasized 
the structural concerns of federalism to reinforce, rather than 
constrict, immigrants’ rights to equal treatment by the states. 
Part IV describes the recent erosion of the divergent standards 
applicable to federal and state cases involving immigration 
                                                                                                     
federal direction set forth by Congress under the Welfare Reform Act”). 
 30. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 31. Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 661 (Conn. 2011); Guaman v. 
Velez, 74 A.3d 931, 951 (N.J. App. Div. 2013), aff’d, 221 N.J. 213 (2015) (per 
curiam). 
 32. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 946 
N.E.2d 1262, 1280 (Mass. 2011); Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector 
Auth. (Finch II), 959 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Mass. 2012); Aliessa v. Novello, 754 
N.E.2d 1085, 1096–98 (N.Y. 2001); Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2006). 
 33. See infra Part V.B. (proposing this approach in detail). 
 34. Id. 
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status, the role of federalism in this development, and the effect: 
the supplanting of norms protective of individual rights with 
those focused on constitutional structure. Part V identifies 
federalism’s place in equal protection analysis involving 
migrants, defines its potentially disruptive impact, and offers a 
prescription. 
II. The Disconnect: A Suspect Classification with Deference 
A. Graham’s Theory of Equality 
In Graham v. Richardson, the Supreme Court declared for 
the first time that alienage is a suspect classification, such that 
state laws distinguishing between lawfully present migrants and 
citizens are presumptively discriminatory and must meet the 
requirements of strict scrutiny.35 The case involved the legality of 
a Pennsylvania law that denied public assistance to legal 
residents and an Arizona law that denied federally subsidized 
benefits to legal residents who had not lived within the United 
States for fifteen years.36 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court 
struck down both laws as violations of equal protection, reasoning 
that a state’s fiscal interests and desire to preserve limited 
welfare benefits for its own citizens did not justify this invidious 
distinction between residents.37 
Although Graham is not one of the Court’s more celebrated 
equal protection decisions, Harold Koh has described it as an 
“equal protection landmark” for good reason.38 It invoked United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.39 for the first time to declare that 
“‘discreteness and insularity’ entitled a minority group to special 
constitutional protection.”40  
                                                                                                     
 35. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971). 
 36. Id. at 366–68. 
 37. Id. at 374–75. 
 38. Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun 
and the Equal Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 59 (1985). 
 39. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
 40. Koh, supra note 38, at 59 (quoting Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene 
Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 n.4 (1982)). This was the first 
and only time the Court recognized a group as a suspect class because it was 
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Under the Carolene Products rubric, recognition of a group as 
a suspect class expresses how disfavored and minority status 
renders that group powerless to vindicate their interests through 
the political process.41 Graham, however, did not engage in any 
discussion of immigrants’ vulnerability or history of 
discrimination. Perhaps considering immigrants’ categorical 
exclusion from voting as self-evident political powerlessness,42 
the Court described “aliens as a class” as a “prime example” of a 
group for which “heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”43  
That unanimous holding is particularly compelling—and 
perhaps surprising—given that it came during a period when the 
Court otherwise endeavored to contain the scope of its equal 
                                                                                                     
both “discrete” and “insular” under Carolene Products. League of United Latin 
Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 541 (2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting) 
(citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290, n.28 (1978))). 
Indeed, as the Court itself has noted, although it has never held that 
“discreteness and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that 
a particular classification is invidious,” “these elements have been relied upon in 
recognizing a suspect class in only one group of cases, those involving aliens.” 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. at 290 n.28 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).  
 41. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (stating “certain 
groups, indeed largely the same groups, have historically been ‘relegated to such 
a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process” (quotations and citation marks omitted) 
(citing Graham, 403 U.S. at 367)); see also Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not 
Without Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect 
Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 984–91 (2014) (critiquing the equal 
protection doctrine’s process-oriented approach to evaluating political 
powerlessness of suspect classes). 
  42. Daniel Kanstroom has argued that, in spite of their inability to vote, 
non-citizens participate in the polity in ways that are essential to the “politico-
legal legitimacy” of constitutional democracy, including through litigation. See 
Daniel Kanstroom, “Alien” Litigation as Polity-Participation: The Positive Power 
of a “Voteless Class of Litigants,” 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 399, 400, 439 
(2012) (“While exclusion from voting, intimidation-by-deportation, and even a 
certain moral marginalization have surely limited noncitizens’ ability to 
leverage political power, alternative pathways have often been found to achieve 
voice and politico-legal influence, and to develop and sustain new conceptions of 
justice itself.”).  
 43. The Court reasoned that “classifications based on alienage, like those 
based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial 
scrutiny.” See Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72 (citing Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
at 152–53 n.4).  
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protection doctrine,44 and in a case in which the Court could have 
easily rested upon its separate preemption holding.45 Moreover, 
unlike earlier cases,46 Graham’s equality analysis was devoid of 
structural concerns; that is, the decision did not depend, or seek 
to bolster itself, upon the federal government’s exclusivity over 
immigration matters.47 Instead, underlying Graham’s conception 
of alienage as a suspect status is a strong normative vision of 
lawfully present noncitizens as “respected, responsible and 
participating member[s]” of society,48 who deserve equal 
treatment.  
To be sure, Graham was not explicit about this normative 
view; it did not even articulate with any precision its justification 
for treating alienage as a suspect classification.49 Nevertheless, in 
explaining why Arizona’s and Pennsylvania’s laws did not meet 
the demands of strict scrutiny, the Court emphasized that 
lawfully present immigrants are similarly situated to citizens vis 
a vis state governments, and thus entitled to similar treatment.50 
                                                                                                     
 44. See Koh, supra note 38, at 59–60 (noting that at the time, the Court 
was “refusing to name new suspect classifications, or to create new 
‘fundamental rights’”). Koh further notes that looking back at Graham as the 
Justices saw it in 1971, it appears an unlikely candidate as an equal protection 
landmark. The parties addressed equal protection as the fourth of four 
arguments challenging the statutes’ validity and devoted only five pages of their 
brief to the argument. Id. at 58.  
 45. Graham, 403 U.S. at 379–80 (describing the basis for the Court’s 
separate preemption holding); see Koh, supra note 38, at 59–60 (describing 
Justice Blackmun’s success “in bringing state classifications that discriminate 
against resident aliens under judicial scrutiny without provoking a dissent” as 
surprising). 
 46. See infra Part II.A–B (discussing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) 
and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)).  
 47. Indeed, Graham’s justification for applying strict scrutiny to the state 
alienage cases, and for concluding that Pennsylvania’s and Arizona’s 
anti-immigrant measures did not survive that scrutiny, never relied upon 
federal supremacy in immigration matters. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 371 (1971). 
 48. Koh, supra note 38, at 98–99 (quoting Kenneth Karst, The Supreme 
Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977)). 
 49. See Soucek, supra note 25, at 174 (stating that the Court did not 
provide much explanation for the classification). 
 50. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 376 (noting that the state laws at issue 
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The Court noted that, like citizens, lawful permanent residents 
contribute financially to the state through both work and taxes, 
may have longstanding connections to the state, and share 
burdens of community membership similar to citizens, such as 
being called into the armed services.51 The Court therefore 
reasoned that excluding this group of immigrants from a fair 
share of state resources on account of their alienage is 
“particularly inappropriate and unreasonable.”52 
It is this aspect of Graham—declaring the inherent 
inequality of a system where migrants shoulder the 
responsibilities of community membership, but not the benefits of 
equal treatment—which, in spite of its uncertain basis for 
treating alienage as a suspect status, makes it unmistakably an 
equality decision.53 It provides the most significant window into 
the court’s normative visions of migrants as equal community 
members, and a likely explanation for why it unanimously chose 
not to resolve the case exclusively on preemption grounds.  
B. Graham’s Limitations and Longevity 
In decisions subsequent to Graham, the Court offered a 
variety of explanations for its recognition of alienage as a suspect 
classification. The Court alternately emphasized immigrants’ 
similarity to citizens,54 their political powerlessness,55 the historic 
                                                                                                     
affected “two classes of needy persons, indistinguishable except with respect to 
whether they are or are not citizens of this country”). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. In a later case, Toll v. Moreno, Justice Blackmun, Graham’s author, 
explained that the Court’s decision recognizing alienage as a suspect status was 
partly based upon its acknowledgment that distinctions drawn on the basis of 
alienage-status are likely to reflect historic “antipathy” toward immigrants. 458 
U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
 54. For example, in In re Griffiths, the Court noted the similarly of 
“resident aliens” to citizens in justifying strict scrutiny. See 413 U.S. 717, 722 
(1973) (reasoning that “[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the 
economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other ways to our 
society,” such that “[i]t is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it 
deprives them of employment opportunities”). 
 55. In Foley v. Connelie, the Court explained Graham’s designation of 
alienage as a suspect classification on grounds of noncitizen’s political 
powerlessness, noting that Graham’s “heightened judicial solitude . . . [was] 
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prejudice visited upon them as a group because of characteristics 
beyond their control,56 and even structural concerns about state 
conflicts with federal immigration policy.57 Although the lower 
courts have selectively relied upon these explanations to reach 
divergent results in cases involving lawfully present non-
immigrants,58 the Supreme Court’s various explanations should 
                                                                                                     
deemed necessary since aliens—pending their eligibility for citizenship—have 
no direct voice in the political processes.” 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (citing United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)). 
 56. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) (citing Graham and 
noting that “[s]ome classifications are more likely than others to reflect deep-
seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate 
objective” and that “[c]lassifications treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to 
any proper legislative goal”).  
 57. In Foley v. Connelie, the Court suggested an additional justification 
beyond immigrants’ political powerlessness. 435 U.S. at 295. The Court stated 
that the state laws at issue in Graham and its progeny warranted close judicial 
scrutiny because “they took position[s] seemingly inconsistent with the 
congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent residence.” In spite 
of Foley’s description, there is, however, little evidence that federalism concerns 
factored into Graham’s equal protection holding at all. In making this 
observation, Foley cites Graham’s separate preemption holding. Id. (citing 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377–78 (1971)). 
 58. In particular, divergent views regarding the significance of the Court 
citing lawful permanent residents’ “similarity” to citizens in Graham has 
resulted in a circuit split as to whether strict scrutiny applies to lawfully 
present nonimmigrants, including individuals with student and visitor visas. 
Compare Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding 
that Louisiana’s denial of nursing licenses to nonimmigrants as a class did not 
warrant strict scrutiny under Graham because unlike lawful permanent 
residents, nonimmigrants are not similarly situated to citizens), LeClerc v. 
Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418, 421 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying rational basis review to a 
Louisiana law that rendered lawfully present nonimmigrants ineligible to take 
the Louisiana Bar Exam after concluding that nonimmigrants, unlike lawful 
permanent residents, are not “similarly situated to citizens in their economic, 
social, and civic (as opposed to political) conditions”), and League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2007) (agreeing 
with LeClerc that lawful permanent residents are similar to citizens in that 
“they pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the armed forces, and are 
entitled to reside permanently in the United States” but that nonimmigrants 
are not, such that a Tennessee law making lawfully present nonimmigrants 
ineligible for drivers’ licenses should be reviewed under rational basis scrutiny), 
with Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 72, 75 (2d. Cir. 2012) (applying strict 
scrutiny and striking down a New York licensing statute that excluded lawfully 
present nonimmigrants from the pharmacy profession after rejecting the Fifth 
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at most suggest that there are multiple good reasons for 
designating alienage as a suspect classification.59  
In fact, in spite of its ambiguity, the Supreme Court has 
never retreated from Graham’s recognition that lawfully present 
migrants are entitled to equal treatment by the states when they 
distribute state resources and benefits or regulate economic 
activity. Indeed, in the years after Graham, the Court has 
continued to closely scrutinize state laws singling out immigrants 
for special burdens and economic disadvantages,60 even while 
recognizing two significant limitations upon its equal protection 
holding.  
I. The Political Function Exception 
Only two years after Graham, the Court recognized that 
strict scrutiny might not always apply to state alienage 
classifications. In 1973 in Sugarman v. Dougall,61 the Court 
recognized that states could constitutionally deny noncitizens 
access to certain state democratic political institutions because 
noncitizens, who cannot vote, have no legitimate claim to equal 
                                                                                                     
and Sixth Circuits’ view that under Graham the similarities between citizens 
and aliens “articulate[d] a test for determining when state discrimination 
against any one subclass of lawful immigrants is subject to strict scrutiny” and 
concluding that, in any event, nonimmigrants are similar to citizens). 
 59. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 n.14 (citing “[s]everal formulations” that explain 
the Court’s “treatment of certain classifications as ‘suspect’” including the 
historic prejudice visited upon vulnerable groups, that classifications treated as 
suspect tend to be irrelevant to any proper legislative goal, and certain group’s 
political powerlessness). 
 60. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718–22 (1993) (invalidating a 
Connecticut statute restricting the bar exam to citizens); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 
U.S. 216, 227–28 (1984) (invalidating a Texas statute requiring that notaries 
public be U.S. citizens); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7–12 (1977) 
(invalidating a statute barring certain resident non-citizens from state financial 
assistance for higher education); Exam. Bd. Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. 
De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1975) (striking state laws preventing resident non-
citizens from obtaining engineering licenses); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 
634, 646 (1973) (invalidating a New York statute barring employment of non-
citizens in the state’s classified competitive civil service).  
 61. 413 U.S. 634, 647–49 (1973).  
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participation in this arena.62 Sugarman articulated what later 
became known as the political function exception—a doctrine that 
led the Court in a series of cases in the late 1970s and early 80s 
to uphold under rational basis review a variety of state laws 
excluding noncitizens from public employment.63  
 Significantly, in recognizing this exception to Graham, 
Sugarman also signaled the end to Court’s separation of 
federalism concerns from equal protection analysis involving 
state alienage restrictions. The Court’s justification for 
modulating its equal protection scrutiny in cases involving state 
political functions rested heavily on federalism concerns, albeit 
not respect for the federal immigration power, but rather, states’ 
Tenth Amendment power to regulate elections and define their 
political community.64  
The Sugarman Court described this state power broadly to 
include “not only” the selection of voter qualifications, but also 
decisions about eligibility for “state elective or important 
nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions.”65 The 
Court reasoned that officers who formulate, execute, or review 
public policy “perform functions that go to the heart of 
representative government.”66 Accordingly, when states exclude 
                                                                                                     
 62. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978) (citing Sugarman, 413 U.S. 
at 647–49). 
 63. Although Sugarman gave life to the political function exception, in 
resolving that particular case, the Court struck down a provision of a New York 
law that conditioned eligibility for permanent state civil service positions on 
citizenship. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 646. The Court reasoned that the blanket 
ban on employment of noncitizens had “little, if any relation” to a state interest 
in preserving its political institutions. Id. at 646–47. 
 64. See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647  
Just as the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep 
for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to 
regulate elections, (e)ach State has the power to prescribe the 
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be 
chosen. Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, 
already noted above, “to preserve the basic conception of a political 
community.”  
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. According to the Court, a state has the prerogative to exclude 
noncitizens “from participation in its democratic political institutions” on 
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noncitizens from such functions and the Court is therefore 
presented “with matters resting firmly within a State's 
constitutional prerogatives,” Sugarman suggested the Court’s 
scrutiny would “not be so demanding.”67 
Not long after, the Court confronted a slew of equal 
protection challenges to state laws excluding immigrants from 
public employment. The Court upheld most of the laws under a 
deferential rational basis scrutiny.68 For example, it upheld laws 
excluding lawful permanent residents from employment as state 
troopers in Foley v. Connelie,69 public school teachers in Ambach 
v. Norwich,70 and probation officers in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido.71 
In each case, the Court was sharply divided.72 Although the 
dissenting justices did not dispute that alienage status could 
justify the exclusion of noncitizens from voting and related 
political functions, they criticized the majority’s acceptance of a 
wide range of public employment involving non-discretionary 
decision-making as actually serving such functions. For example, 
in his dissent in Foley, Justice Stevens criticized the Court’s 
political function cases as sanctioning discrimination that 
perpetuated political patronage that necessarily and historically 
excluded noncitizens.73  
                                                                                                     
account of its historic and constitutional “responsibility for the establishment 
and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications of an 
appropriately designated class of public office holders.” Id. at 648.  
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444 (1982) (upholding a 
citizenship requirement for probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 
80 (1979) (upholding a citizenship requirement for public school teachers); Foley 
v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299–300 (1978) (upholding a citizenship requirement 
for police officers). 
 69. 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978). 
 70. 441 U.S. 68, 73–74 (1979) (affirming “the general principle that some 
state functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a 
governmental entity as to permit the exclusion from those functions of all 
persons who have not become part of the process of self-government”). 
 71. 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982). 
 72. In Foley, the decision was 6–3, and in Ambach and Cabell, the Court 
divided 5-4. 
 73. See Foley, 435 U.S. at 308–09 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The widespread 
exclusion of aliens from such positions today may well be nothing more than a 
vestige of the historical relationship between nonvoting aliens and a system of 
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Debate about the political function cases and their impact on 
Graham’s theory of equality continued years later, even as the 
Court moved away from equal protection as the primary means of 
analyzing state alienage classifications. Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
dissenting as a then-Associate Justice in Toll v. Moreno,74 for 
example, later questioned whether immigrants’ political 
powerlessness was a “legitimate reason for treating aliens as a 
‘suspect class,’” given that the Court had also relied upon this 
very characteristic to justify state restrictions excluding 
noncitizens from state political functions.75 He contended that 
this dualism reflected the Court’s growing discomfort with 
alienage as a suspect classification,76 a proposition sharply 
disputed by Graham’s author, Justice Blackmun, in response.77 
Justice Blackmun noted the multiple reasons for treating 
alienage as a suspect status and rejected the notion that the 
political function cases are incompatible with that recognition.78 
                                                                                                     
distributing the spoils of victory to the party faithful.”). 
 74. 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
 75. Id. at 41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also cases cited supra note 68 
(upholding various citizenship requirements).  
 76. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 42 n.12 (1982) (“If the Court has 
eschewed strict scrutiny in the ‘political process’ cases, it may be because the 
Court is becoming uncomfortable with the categorization of aliens as a suspect 
class.”). 
 77. Justice Blackmun responded that Graham recognized that lawfully 
present noncitizens are similarly situated to citizens “for most legislative 
purposes,” such that distinctions drawn on the basis of alienage-status are likely 
to reflect historic “antipathy” toward immigrants. Id. at 22 (Blackmun, J., 
concurring). He reasoned that the politic function exception did not undermine 
these fundamental principles because noncitizens’ political powerlessness only 
heightened the need for judicial protection given migrants’ inability to respond 
to such antipathy through the political process. Id. at 23. He further noted that 
the reason for a discrete and insular minority’s exclusion from political power 
has never been significant; “instead, the fact of powerlessness is crucial, for in 
combination with prejudice it is the minority group’s inability to assert its 
political interests that ‘curtail[s] the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.’” Id. (quoting United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)). 
 78. Id. at 19–22 (“[T]he Court always has recognized that aliens may be 
denied use of the mechanisms of self-government, and all of the alienage cases 
have been decided against the backdrop of that principle.”). 
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He reasoned that “[i]f this dual aspect of alienage doctrine is 
unique, it is because aliens constitute a unique class.”79  
The political function cases can fairly be criticized on their 
own terms. To be sure, it is difficult to reconcile the Court’s 
various conclusions as to whether particular public employees 
“perform functions that go to the heart of representative 
government”80—for instance, that a probation officer is more 
essential to a state’s political community than a lawyer.81 But the 
exception itself does not undermine Graham’s theory of immigrants’ 
rights. In fact, it reinforces it.82  
As Justice Blackmun explained in his opinion in Toll, that the 
Constitution permits the exclusion of noncitizens “from participating 
in the process of self-government makes particularly profound the 
need for searching judicial review of classifications grounded on 
alienage” status.83 Indeed, migrants’ political powerlessness 
“overcomes the usual presumption that even improvident decisions 
affecting minorities will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
                                                                                                     
 79. Toll, 458 U.S. at 22. 
 80. Id. According to the Court, recognizing a state’s prerogative to exclude 
noncitizens “from participation in its democratic political institutions” simply 
acknowledges the state’s historic and constitutional “responsibility for the 
establishment and operation of its own government, as well as the qualifications 
of an appropriately designated class of public office holders.” Id. at 648.  
 81. Compare Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 444 (1982) (upholding 
a citizenship requirement for probation officers), with In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 
717, 726–27 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny and striking down under the Equal 
Protection Clause a Connecticut law barring lawful permanent residents from 
taking the bar exam), and Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973) 
(invalidating a New York statute barring employment of non-citizens in the 
state’s classified competitive civil service). See also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 
68, 81 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing inconsistent outcomes in 
political function cases). 
 82. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that the Court’s political function decisions “pointedly have declined 
to retreat from the position that restrictions on lawfully resident aliens that 
primarily affect economic interests are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny,” 
“reflect[ing] the Court’s proper judgment that the alienage cases are not 
irreconcilable or inconsistent with one another”). 
 83. See id. at 23 (reasoning that “the fact of powerlessness is crucial, for in 
combination with prejudice it is the minority group’s inability to assert its 
political interests that curtails the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities”) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
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process.”84 As Daniel Kanstroom has stated, “[t]he problem for 
noncitizens is deeper than minority status[;]. They do not get out-
voted; they cannot vote at all.”85 While this relationship does not 
undermine the rationale for either doctrinal thread, commentators86 
and jurists alike,87 nevertheless, have pointed—unconvincingly—
to this exceptionalism as evidence that Graham’s theory of 
equality is untenable. 
The political function doctrine, however, is not a case of the 
exception swallowing the rule. Rather, two distinct and 
reconcilable rules inform the doctrine. Courts permit 
discrimination against non-citizens in the context of state laws 
relating to political participation because of states’ sovereign 
authority to determine membership in their political community. 
Outside of that realm, however, citizenship most often is 
irrelevant to other state legislative purposes.  
2. The Equal Protection Dichotomy 
The second major qualification of Graham came only a few 
years later in Mathews v. Diaz,88 when the Court held that 
Graham’s recognition of alienage as a suspect classification did 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. Kanstroom, supra note 42, at 436. 
 86. See Cox, supra note 10, at 352 (charging that the Court’s alienage 
doctrine is incoherent because “in some cases courts have suggested that 
alienage classifications are suspect and trigger heightened scrutiny, but in other 
cases courts have suggested that some alienage restrictions are due great 
judicial deference”). 
 87. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649, 658 (1973) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (questioning Graham and criticizing the Sugarman 
majority’s reliance upon Graham’s reasoning that migrants and citizens are 
“indistinguishable for purposes of equal protection analysis”); Toll, 458 U.S. at 
41 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (“If the exclusion of aliens from the political 
processes is legitimate, as it clearly is, there is reason to doubt whether political 
powerlessness is any longer a legitimate reason for treating aliens as a ‘suspect 
class’ deserving of ‘heightened judicial solicitude.’”); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 
875, 889 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring) (“A review of the history of 
alienage jurisprudence, with a particular review of Graham . . . suggests that it 
is time to rethink the doctrine.”). 
 88. 426 U.S. 67 (1975). 
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not apply to laws enacted by Congress.89 The Court declined to 
view federal laws distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens 
as presumptively invidious, given Congress’s “broad power over 
naturalization and immigration.”90 In light of the federal 
government’s responsibility for the regulation of migrants, rooted 
in its authority over foreign affairs, the Court declined to 
encroach upon congressional decisions regarding whether and 
when the nature of an immigrant’s relationship with the United 
States might warrant an equal share of public resources.91  
In language that engendered—and has since long been cited 
in preserving—an “equal protection dichotomy” in cases involving 
alienage status, the Court identified the divergent outcome in 
Graham as consistent, and actually supportive, of the Court’s 
decision in Mathews.92 The Court reasoned that Graham’s equal 
protection analysis “involved significantly different 
considerations because it concern[ed] the relationship between 
aliens and the States rather than between aliens and the Federal 
Government.”93 According to the Court, “a division by a State of 
the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into 
subcategories of United States citizens and aliens has no 
apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification by 
the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate 
part of its business.”94  
Unlike Graham, Mathews’ equal protection analysis turned 
upon structural concerns. The Court disclaimed a meaningful 
judicial role in checking the political branches’ decisions related 
to immigration policy, reciting the familiar contours of the 
plenary power doctrine: that “[t]he reasons that preclude judicial 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. at 84–85 (distinguishing Graham and applying rational basis 
review to a federal Medicare restriction based on alienage status after reasoning 
that equal protection analysis “involves significantly different considerations” 
when “it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than 
between aliens and the Federal Government”).  
 90. Id. at 79–80. 
 91. Id. The Court declared it “unquestionably reasonable for Congress to 
make an alien's eligibility depend on both the character and the duration of his 
residence.” Id. at 83.  
 92. Id. at 84–85. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 85.  
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review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of 
review of decisions made by the Congress or the President in the 
area of immigration and naturalization.”95  
At the time, scholars criticized Mathews for accepting that 
Congress’s alienage-based restriction on benefits challenged in 
the case actually constituted an immigration regulation.96 In the 
decades that followed, however, courts and commentators have 
generally accepted the dichotomy between the equal protection 
obligations of the state and federal governments with respect to 
migrants as a justifiable distinction based upon their respective 
powers.97 In fact, the divergent standards have comfortably 
existed as an anomaly within equal protection doctrine more 
broadly, which, outside the context of alienage status, requires 
congruence between the equal protection requirements applicable 
to federal and state governments through the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.98 Indeed, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
                                                                                                     
 95. Id. at 81–82. 
 96. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that 
Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1066 (1994) (discussing criticism); see 
also Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment 
by the National Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 334 (1997) (arguing that 
the restriction on Medicare benefits in Mathews v. Diaz, “was not in any obvious 
way concerned with immigration”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation 
of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 862, 869 (1989) (arguing that 
“the courts have wrongly assumed that every federal regulation based on 
alienage is necessarily sustainable as an exercise of the immigration power”). 
 97. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1105 (noting that “[o]ver time . . . the 
distinction between the two cases has come to be treated as largely self-evident” 
and commentators have accepted “the contrast as the inevitable result of the 
division of labor between the states and the federal government”); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the 
Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1439 (1995) 
(“Congressional discrimination receives deference because it is presumed to 
reflect the weighing of factors that the states are neither likely nor 
constitutionally competent to assess.”). 
 98. Specifically, Adarand Constructors v. Pena confirmed that the 
guarantees of equal protection mean the same thing under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments—what Justice O’Conner called, in the context of race-
based classifications, “congruence.” See 515 U.S. 200, 226–27 (1995) (holding 
“that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict 
scrutiny”). In Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), the Court earlier 
stated that because “the Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining 
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v. Peña,99 the case in which the Court clarified this principle of 
“congruence,” Justice O’Conner referenced the special deference 
to federal immigration regulations as an appropriate exception to 
the general rule of congruence.100  
In the end, Graham survived two significant limitations upon 
its holding.101 One might expect its requirement of strict scrutiny 
to be insulated from shifts in federal immigration policy, 
particularly in light of its characterization of alienage as a “prime 
example” of Carolene Products vulnerability,102 and the Court’s 
discussion of state equal protection obligations to lawfully present 
immigrants separate and apart from federalism and supremacy 
concerns. As the following discussion demonstrates, however, 
within a recent body of federal and state court decisions that has 
not been the case. The following section explores this disconnect 
and offers some initial explanations for it.  
                                                                                                     
racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same 
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”  
 99. 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995).  
 100. Indeed, the Court has expressly accepted non-congruence in the 
alienage cases. See id. (“We do not understand a few contrary suggestions 
appearing in cases in which we found special deference to the political branches 
of the Federal Government to detract from this general rule.” (citing Hampton v. 
Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100, 101–02 n.21 (1976) (discussing federal power 
over immigration))). Moreover, even after Mathews, the Court continued to cite 
Graham as an example of a suspect classification requiring heightened judicial 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.14 (1982) (citing Graham’s 
requirement of strict scrutiny); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265, 290 (1978) (citing Graham when discussing suspect classifications). 
 101. As Linda Bosniak has noted, in subsequent cases “the Court has 
reaffirmed the equality analysis” and its vision of aliens as the proper “subjects 
of equality.” See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1056, 1107 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 
U.S. 717, 729 (1973)) (holding that Connecticut’s wholesale ban of resident non-
citizens from admission to the bar violates the Equal Protection Clause); 
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973) (striking down a New York law 
that allowed only citizens to hold permanent positions in the competitive class of 
the state civil service).  
 102. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (citing United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)). 
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B. Federalism on the Rise 
In spite of Graham, recently before the lower courts, equal 
protection jurisprudence addressed to alienage status has focused 
less on rights and more on constitutional structure, operating 
much like preemption doctrine in that the validity of state laws is 
largely determined not by the state’s justification, but rather by 
congressional policy choices. State classifications that treat 
lawfully present immigrants differently from citizens on the basis 
of alienage status are likely to be upheld if a state’s restriction is 
consistent with federal immigration law or if Congress purports 
to “sanction” the state’s action.103 Conversely, courts have cited 
conflicts with federal immigration policy in striking down state 
alienage classification on equal protection grounds.104  
Though this trend has wider reach, the prime example of 
federalism’s recent impact in equal protection doctrine involving 
lawfully present immigrants is the line of cases interpreting the 
1996 welfare reform act, the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).105 Several courts 
have viewed PRWORA’s authorization for states to deny 
state-funded public benefits to immigrants as dispositive of the 
equal protection inquiry.106 As a result, these decisions have 
                                                                                                     
 103. See cases cited supra note 87 (providing examples where courts found 
that the challenged law was consistent with federal immigration law or that 
Congress sanctioned the state’s action). 
 104. See, e.g., Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying 
strict scrutiny to a New York licensing statute that excluded lawful 
nonimmigrants from the pharmacy profession because the regulatory scheme 
“seeks to prohibit some legally admitted aliens from doing the very thing the 
federal government indicated they could do when they came to the United 
States—work”). 
 105. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA or Welfare Reform Act of 1996), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 
(1996). 
 106. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(upholding Colorado’s alienage-based denial of healthcare benefits to lawful 
permanent residents based upon PRWORA); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 887 
(9th Cir. 2014) (upholding Hawaii’s limitation of public benefits available to 
resident immigrants because of PRWORA); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 72 
(1st Cir. 2014) (upholding Maine’s alienage-based denial of public benefits 
because of PRWORA). 
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upheld alienage-based restrictions in state public benefits 
schemes under a rational basis scrutiny historically reserved for 
the federal government’s immigration regulations.107  
For example, in 2004, in Soskin v. Reinertson,108 a divided 
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a 
Colorado law denying healthcare benefits to lawful permanent 
residents on equal terms as citizens. It did so under rational basis 
scrutiny, reasoning that Graham did not dictate the result in 
light of the “specific Congressional authorization for the state’s 
action, the PRWORA.”109 In 2014, the First110 and Ninth 
Circuits111 cited Soskin and upheld similar laws limiting public 
benefits to immigrants based upon alienage status, after applying 
rational basis scrutiny. 
Although the circuit courts reasoned that Graham’s vitality 
was not in question because it did not, according to the courts, 
address the impact of congressional action purporting to sanction 
states’ differential treatment of lawfully present noncitizens112—
this qualification actually minimizes—and misconstrues—a 
significant piece of Graham’s reasoning. Specifically, in Graham, 
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that 
Congress could authorize alienage-based discrimination by the 
states, after Arizona argued that its imposition of an 
alienage-based durational residency requirement for welfare 
benefits was authorized by the Social Security Act of 1935.113 The 
                                                                                                     
 107. Cases discussed infra Part IV. 
 108. See 353 F.3d at 1255 (citing PRWORA and reasoning that if “a state 
determines that the burden” or providing state-funded benefits “is too high and 
decides against optional coverage, it is addressing the Congressional concern 
(not just a parochial state concern) that individual aliens not burden the public 
benefits system” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 109. Id. at 1251. 
 110. Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 61 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 111. Korab, 748 F.3d at 875. 
 112. See Bruns, 750 F.3d at 66 (stating “the alienage-based distinction in 
this case does not originate purely from state legislation, unlike the restrictions 
struck down in Graham”); Korab, 748 F.3d at 882 (viewing Hawaii’s 
post-PRWORA denial of healthcare benefits as presenting a hybrid case between 
Graham’s and Mathews’s “pristine examples of the bookends on the power to 
impose alien classifications”). 
 113. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (refusing to 
construe the federal statutes cited by Arizona and Pennsylvania as 
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Court reasoned that “[a]lthough the Federal Government 
admittedly has broad constitutional power to determine what 
aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they 
may remain, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization, 
Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual 
States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”114  
The convergence in equal protection scrutiny applicable to 
state and federal laws that has developed in spite of this 
reasoning thus exposes a potential crack in Graham’s foundation. 
Indeed, Judge Jay Bybee’s concurring opinion in the 2014 Ninth 
Circuit case, Korab v. Fink,115 spotlights what he portrayed as a 
major fissure.  
In addressing an equal protection challenge to Hawaii’s 
PRWORA-sanctioned denial of health care benefits to lawfully 
present state residents, Judge Bybee opined that courts should 
employ “preemption analysis instead of equal protection analysis 
in alienage cases,”116 reincarnating earlier scholarly debates 
regarding which form of constitutional review should resolve 
challenges to state laws classifying on the basis of alienage 
status.117 Citing the political function cases, the equal protection 
                                                                                                     
“authoriz[ing] discriminatory treatment of aliens at the option of the States” 
which would present “serious constitutional questions”). 
 114. Id. (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638–41 (1969)). 
 115. See 797 F.3d 572, 584 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring) (writing 
“separately to explain why the law of alienage remains so unclear and how we 
might better approach it”). 
 116. See id. at 585 (“The equal protection principle announced in Graham 
has proven unsustainable.”). Declaring equal protection doctrine involving 
alienage discrimination a “conundrum,” Judge Bybee charged that Graham’s 
theory of alien rights was “unsupportable” from the start given the Supreme 
Court’s unwillingness to impose the same equal protection obligations upon the 
Federal Government in accordance with Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) 
(stating that it would be “unthinkable” if the equal protection obligations of the 
Federal Government under the Fifth Amendment were not coextensive with the 
equal protection obligations of the States). Id. at 888.  
 117. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 1430–31 (rejecting the argument that 
equal protection doctrine concerning immigrants is unduly complex and should 
“be abandoned and replaced by a federal preemption analysis”); Koh, supra note 
38, at 87 (noting that recent commentators had “hailed federal preemption as 
the unseen solution to the ‘glaring doctrinal anomaly’ in the Court’s alienage 
jurisprudence” and “that preemption and equal protection have been described 
as ‘vying for predominance in the field of alienage’”).  
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dichotomy, and the more deferential scrutiny applicable to 
classifications based upon migrants’ undocumented status, Judge 
Bybee opined that the Graham doctrine was unworkable because 
it has been “riddled with exceptions and caveats that make 
consistent judicial review of alienage classifications difficult.”118 
On the one hand, Judge Bybee’s call to abandon equal 
protection analysis in favor of preemption is remarkable, given 
that the case involved a state’s differential treatment of lawfully 
present residents and citizens in a state public benefits scheme—
a classic Graham fact pattern, notwithstanding the added 
consideration of PRWORA. Even more so, Judge Bybee posed his 
dramatic proposition—doing away with equal protection analysis 
for lawfully present migrants—without demonstrating any actual 
incoherence in the alienage doctrine, beyond describing the 
existence of Graham’s exceptions.119 This is an odd argument 
given that exceptions, in fact, can bring coherence to a rule that 
does not apply in every case. On the other hand, Judge Bybee’s 
concurrence might be less a provocative entreaty to substitute 
preemption as the response to immigrant claims of unequal 
treatment and instead simply a candid description of what, in 
many instances, is already occurring—a variant of preemption 
posing as equal protection analysis.120  
                                                                                                     
 118. Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 585 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., concurring). 
 119. For example, Judge Bybee posits that “[f]rom the outset, the Graham 
rule, simpliciter, was unsupportable” because it could never apply to the federal 
government, while Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. at 500, established that the 
federal and state equal protection obligations must be the same. See Korab, 797 
F.3d at 589–90. But Graham’s rule was specifically addressed to migrants’ right 
to equal treatment by the states regarding public resources and economic 
opportunities. The Court did not profess to create a rule that also applied to the 
federal government’s immigration regulations, which are authorized, in part, by 
the federal government’s exclusive authority to manage foreign affairs. The 
Court has concluded that congruence simply is not compelled when it comes to 
powers possessed exclusively by the federal government, but not the states. See 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1995) (“We do not 
understand a few contrary suggestions appearing in cases in which we found 
special deference to the political branches of the Federal Government to detract 
from this general rule.” (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100, 
101–102 n.21 (1976) (federal power over immigration))).  
 120. See Heeren, supra note 11, at 374 (“Although courts are willing to 
enforce the federal government’s power to preempt state immigration law and to 
deeply probe the rationality of immigration decisions, they are less likely to 
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Part III analyzes this recent influence of federalism in the 
new equal protection jurisprudence embodied by Soskin, and the 
decisions that have followed it, and demonstrates why Judge 
Bybee is wrong: federalism can play a meaningful role in equal 
protection doctrine involving alienage status without hollowing 
out the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination norms 
altogether in favor of the Supremacy Clause. That Graham might 
not apply in every alienage case is not a fatal flaw.  
This disconnect between Graham’s promise of equality and 
the disruptive impact of federalism on recent equal protection 
jurisprudence in the realm of immigrants’ rights has not received 
the critical attention it deserves. Scholarship has questioned the 
basis for distinguishing between federal immigration regulations 
and state “alienage” classifications, given the overlapping nature 
of laws regulating migrants’ entry and exit, and their lives once 
present in the United States.121 One commentator has analyzed 
how preemption and skepticism of agency decision-making have 
substituted for rights-based analysis, following a shift away from 
                                                                                                     
concede what was once a given—that immigrants are largely entitled to equal 
treatment.”). 
 121. Adam Cox describes immigration rules as selection rules governing who 
may enter or exit the country or “how we choose immigrants” and immigration 
regulation laws—referred to as “alienage” law when it comes to the states—or 
“how we treat those immigrants whom we have chosen.” Cox, supra note 10, at 
370. Linda Bosniak describes the two domains as one of membership and 
personhood, or regulation “inside” immigration law, and regulation “outside.” 
Bosniak, supra note 96 at 1058. As Hiroshi Motomura has noted, these 
categories are often difficult to separate because of their “functional overlap” in 
that “‘[a]lienage’ rules may be surrogates for ‘immigration’ rules” where the 
“intended and/or actual effect of an alienage rule is to affect immigration 
patterns.” Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and 
Proposition 187, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 201, 202 (1994) [hereinafter Immigration and 
Alienage]. Vice versa, Motomura argues that “‘immigration’ rules may be 
surrogates for ‘alienage’ rules” where, for example, “the intended and actual 
effect of deportation grounds is to regulate the everyday lives of aliens in the 
United States no less than do rules governing their access to public benefits.” Id. 
at 203. As Adam Cox has argued, “The process of selecting immigrants is deeply 
and irrevocably intertwined with the process of regulating their daily lives.” 
Cox, supra note 10, at 393. For her part, Clare Huntington argues that the 
blurring of immigration and alienage regulation suggests that “it makes more 
sense to think about immigration law and alienage law as part of a continuum 
of immigration regulation.” Huntington, supra note 10, at 826. 
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equal protection when courts assess laws regulating migrants.122 
Other scholars have viewed PRWORA’s “authorization” to the 
states to decide for themselves whether or not to provide state-
funded benefits to immigrants as an unlawful attempt by 
Congress to devolve immigration authority to state 
governments.123 Absent from the literature, however, is a critical 
account of the blurring line in equal protection doctrine between 
federal and state laws classifying on the basis of alienage status 
and whether Graham’s promise of equality has been realized, or 
subordinated to interloping federalism concerns. 
Michael Wishnie’s argument that Congress is powerless to 
alter states’ Fourteenth Amendment obligations by sharing its 
immigration power with the states provides an important 
starting place for this much-needed conversation. Following 
PRWORA’s adoption, he argued that Congress could not insulate 
the states from the requirements of equal protection because the 
federal power to regulate immigration is “exclusively national” 
and incapable “of devolution to the states.”124 Wishnie reasoned 
that to expand the deference afforded to the federal government 
to state regulations affecting immigrants would “erode the 
antidiscrimination and anticaste principles that are at the heart 
of our Constitution.”125  
                                                                                                     
 122. See Heeren, supra note 11, at 372 (noting that “when immigrants make 
communitarian claims for equal treatment—a share in the privileges and 
benefits of citizenship—their claims are increasingly rejected”). Heeren has 
argued that a narrowing of equal protection doctrine as a general matter has 
made it “more difficult for noncitizens to prevail on individual rights claims” and 
has forced advocates to find “alternative theories” in federalism and 
administrative law outside “the arena of individual rights.” Id. at 207–08. 
 123. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 496 (“The Welfare Act’s authorization of 
state discrimination against immigrants was an attempt by Congress to devolve 
some of the exclusively federal immigration power to the states . . . .”); 
Huntington, supra note 10, at 839 (“Under the PRWORA, the federal 
government delegates its authority to determine eligibility for federal benefits to 
states and localities.”); see also Victor C. Romero, Devolution and 
Discrimination, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 377, 386 (2002) (describing 
outcomes of immigration devolution as a “mixed bag” with regard to class based 
discrimination where devolution could open the door for state innovation 
regarding rights, including for same-sex couples). 
 124. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 494.  
 125. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 494, 553. 
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Wishnie’s conclusion that PRWORA did not alter states’ 
Fourteenth Amendment obligations to lawfully present migrants 
is convincing, but his primary inquiry, whether Congress can 
delegate immigration lawmaking authority to the states, does not 
fully explain PRWORA’s impact or the recent convergence in 
equal protection jurisprudence involving federal and state 
alienage classifications.  
Specifically, in the years since Wishnie’s article, the courts 
that have sanctioned state denials of welfare benefits to 
immigrants under rational basis scrutiny have not considered the 
states to be exercising a delegated immigration power. Rather, 
PRWORA has served a different legitimizing function. In a 
variety of ways, explained in more detail in Part III, courts have 
viewed federal policy much in the way they would in a 
preemption case: so long as Congress does not object to the states’ 
alienage-based denials of benefits, such measures are deemed 
valid and complementary to congressional policy.126 
Moreover, the uniform rule doctrine, which many courts have 
relied upon to justify applying rational basis review to state 
denials of public benefits to migrants, is not really a delegation 
doctrine, but a supremacy one. That is, when courts accept that 
Congress has created a uniform immigration rule for states to 
follow, they are really concluding that Congress has set 
immigration policy, which the Supremacy Clause requires states 
to follow; they are not ruling that Congress has shared (or 
devolved) immigration rulemaking power so that the states may 
set their own immigration law.127 But courts have muddied this 
doctrinal distinction by concluding that PRWORA established a 
uniform rule for states to follow in circumstances where Congress 
did not mandate particular state action and instead recognized 
states’ discretion with respect to state-funded healthcare 
benefits.128 This analysis is, in my view, a flawed application of 
                                                                                                     
 126. Infra Part III. 
 127. See infra notes 199–207 (discussing Plyler). 
 128. See, e.g., Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 581 (9th Cir. 2015).  
Considering the Welfare Reform Act as a whole, it establishes a 
uniform federal structure for providing welfare benefits to distinct 
classes of aliens. The entire benefit scheme flows from these 
classifications, and a state’s limited discretion to implement a plan 
for a specified category of aliens does not defeat or undermine 
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the uniform rule doctrine, and delegation does not therefore 
explain, nor justify, the courts’ conclusions. 
In addition, Wishnie acknowledged that the devolution that 
is the focus of his argument was “not explicit” in PRWORA but 
“should be presumed because, under any other construction of the 
Welfare Act, the current rash of anti-immigrant state welfare 
rules are obviously invalid under Graham’s settled rule that state 
welfare discrimination against legal immigrants is 
unconstitutional.”129 But that framing fails to account for how 
federalism principles more broadly, even without delegation, 
could similarly and illegitimately undermine Graham. That is, 
delegation is not the only means by which courts might affect a 
rollback of Graham. Whereas Wishnie’s article took aim at the 
reasons why delegation could not insulate states from the 
requirements of equal protection (given his argument that the 
federal government cannot devolve the immigration power to the 
states), this Article argues Congress cannot through its own 
policy choices sanction state discrimination against immigrants.  
Moreover, while the shift in equal protection examined in 
this Article has largely occurred in a particular set of cases 
interpreting PRWORA,130 its import goes beyond the construction 
of a single statute. First, the preempting of equal protection 
described in these cases reinforces an already existing tendency 
in the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence—Graham 
notwithstanding—to emphasize the structural concerns of 
federalism in equal protection cases involving alienage-status.131 
                                                                                                     
uniformity. In arguing to the contrary, the dissent ignores that “a 
state’s exercise of discretion can also effectuate national policy.”  
(quoting Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1257, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004)).  
 129. Wishnie, supra note 14, at 496. 
 130. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(applying rational basis scrutiny to Colorado’s PRWORA-based alien eligibility 
restrictions); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
Hawaii’s PRWORA-based health benefits law for classes of nonimmigrant 
aliens); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 2014) (upholding Maine’s 
termination of medical assistance benefits post-PRWORA). 
 131. See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) 
(“State laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the entrance or 
residence of aliens lawfully within the United States conflict with this 
constitutionally derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have 
accordingly been held invalid.”); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (noting 
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While that emphasis has historically worked to reinforce 
immigrants’ rights, the latest iteration of this tendency before the 
lower courts demonstrates how Graham’s promise of 
constitutionally protected equality is vulnerable when federalism 
concerns dictate equal protection analysis, allowing the inevitable 
political variability of federal immigration policy to largely 
determine immigrants’ right to equal treatment by the states. In 
other words, the federalism problem for noncitizens’ equal 
protection rights that PRWORA helps to expose may also extend 
beyond that statute’s attempt to immunize state denials of 
welfare benefits. 
Indeed, expansive deference to federalism concerns and 
congressional policy is evident outside the PRWORA context in 
cases involving lawfully present immigrants’ equal access to 
professional licenses, drivers’ licenses, and other employment 
opportunities.132 These cases cannot be theorized based upon the 
delegation theory that is the focus of Wishnie’s insightful 
critique133 because the anti-immigrant measures in those 
instances were not enacted pursuant to a purportedly authorizing 
federal statute. There are thus important reasons to better 
understand these doctrinal developments and potential impact 
beyond PRWORA and the delegation theory that that statute 
necessarily invites. To do so, federalism’s existing and potential 
role in equality analysis must be established. 
                                                                                                     
that the states “took position[s] seemingly inconsistent with the congressional 
determination to admit the alien to permanent residence”). 
 132. See, e.g., Van Staden v. St. Martin, 664 F.3d 56, 61–62 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding under rational basis review a Louisiana statute that denied lawful 
nonimmigrants the ability to apply for nursing licenses); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 
F.3d 405, 431 (5th Cir. 2005) (upholding under rational basis review a Louisiana 
rule that rendered lawfully present nonimmigrants ineligible to take the 
Louisiana Bar Exam); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 81 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(applying strict scrutiny to strike down a New York licensing statute that 
excluded lawfully present nonimmigrants from the pharmacy profession).  
 133. See Wishnie, supra note 14, at 496 (explaining that Congress devolved 
“some of the exclusively federal immigration power to the states”). 
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III. Federalism’s Historic Role in the State Alienage Cases 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressed to state laws 
classifying on the basis of alienage status has been pendular—
swinging between two constitutional doctrines, preemption and 
equal protection. Recently, the Court has evaluated the legality of 
state laws targeting immigrants largely through the Supremacy 
Clause.134 But for a time, equal protection was the Supreme 
Court’s preferred means of resolving challenges to state laws 
imposing alienage-based burdens on states’ immigrant 
residents.135 But even in these cases, the Court has often justified 
the result based upon the federal government’s exclusive 
authority to regulate immigration to the United States and the 
conditions of immigrants’ authorization to remain here.136 
The multiple explanations and normative goals that might 
account for the Court’s reliance upon federalism principles in 
these equal protection cases are identified and critiqued below. 
This catalogue and criticism provides a foundation for this 
Article’s ultimate claim: that federalism can play a legitimate role 
in equal protection doctrine involving alienage status when it 
serves as a lens through which to gauge arbitrary discrimination, 
whether state or federal, but federalism should not stealthily 
serve as a preemption-like doctrine beneath the surface in equal 
protection cases.137 When the validity of state laws 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1982) (declining to decide whether 
a Maryland law excluding nonimmigrants from public tuition benefits violated 
equal protection, and instead striking down the law on preemption grounds); 
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2495 (2012) (striking down three 
Arizona immigration enforcement measures under the Supremacy Clause); 
Whiting v. Chamber of Commerce, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1970 (2011) (analyzing 
validity of Arizona business licensing law that addressed unauthorized 
employment of noncitizen workers under preemption). 
 135. See Heeren, supra note 11, at 398 (“The Burger Court struck down an 
extraordinary amount of state legislation on equal protection grounds. In at 
least two of these cases, the plaintiffs also raised preemption . . . .”). The Court 
first focused on equal protection as a means of regulating state alienage 
classifications in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), and Truax v. Raich, 
239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
 136. Cases cited infra notes 138–174. 
 137. This potentially disruptive impact of federalism and supremacy 
principles on migrants’ equal protection claims before the states contrasts with 
typical sovereignty-based federalism objections which Heather Gerken notes 
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disadvantaging immigrants turns on congressional policy choices, 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidiscrimination norms are 
forfeited to majoritarian politics.  
A. Ultra Vires State Action 
Long before Graham, courts considered federalism principles 
in equal protection cases involving alienage status as a means of 
ferreting out arbitrary state motivations. Under this approach, 
state action imposing burdens uniquely upon immigrants for 
purposes of immigration control is treated as presumptively 
unjustified and discriminatory because the state lacks power to 
regulate immigration in the first place.138 The Court’s 1915 
decision in Truax v. Raich139 exemplifies this approach.  
In Truax, the Court struck down an Arizona law that 
required businesses with more than five employees to maintain 
80% of the positions for qualified electors and “native-born 
citizens,” reasoning that denying noncitizens the right to work 
solely because of their alienage status undermined “the very 
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the 
purpose of the Amendment to secure.”140 But although the Court 
decided Truax on the basis of equal protection, federalism 
concerns figured prominently in the Court’s reasoning.141 
                                                                                                     
often reflect concerns that “local power is a threat to minority rights” and that 
“state decisions that fly in the face of deeply held national norms will be 
insulated from reversal.” Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9, 46 (2010).  
 138. Bryan Soucek, in an article analyzing the role of federalism in equal 
protection jurisprudence addressed to marriage equality (and the alienage cases 
by comparison), proposes that federalism be factored into equal protection 
analysis under a similar “interest constraining” approach, whereby the ability of 
the state or federal government to justify discrimination is limited by the 
relative strength or weakness of the particular sovereign’s authority to regulate 
in a given area. Soucek, supra note 25, at 167–71.  
 139. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
 140. Id. at 41. 
 141. Id. at 42. In spite of its holding as to private employment, Truax 
suggested that states could nevertheless preserve public resources for citizens at 
the expense of noncitizens. See id. at 40 (noting that the 
“discrimination . . . involved” was particularly unjustified because it “imposed 
upon the conduct of ordinary private enterprise”). Graham later disavowed this 
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Even without mentioning the Supremacy Clause, the Court’s 
reasoning sounded in preemption doctrine.142 The Court reasoned 
that the “legitimate interests of the State . . . cannot be so broadly 
conceived as to bring them into hostility to exclusive Federal 
power,” over immigration control, namely the decision “to admit 
or exclude aliens.”143 That authority, the Court noted, “is vested 
solely in the Federal Government.”144 The Court characterized 
the denial of the opportunity to earn a livelihood as “tantamount 
to the assertion of the right to deny [immigrants] entrance and 
abode” such that Arizona’s law would conflict with federal law.145 
Specifically, “those lawfully admitted to the country under the 
authority of the acts of Congress, instead of enjoying in a 
substantial sense and in their full scope the privileges conferred 
by the admission, would be segregated in such of the States as 
chose to offer hospitality.”146 
One might fairly read the federalism analysis in Truax as an 
unstated alternative ground for striking down the law under the 
Supremacy Clause.147 But even if Truax contains an embedded 
                                                                                                     
aspect of Truax, noting that the Court’s subsequent decision in Takahashi v. 
Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), discussed infra, rejected this 
special public-interest doctrine. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 
(1971) (concluding “a State’s desire to preserve limited welfare benefits for its 
own citizens” failed to justify the states’ denial of benefits to legal residents).  
 142. Although Truax was decided on equal protection grounds, in 2012 the 
Supreme Court cited it in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507 (2012), 
a preemption case. There, the Court invalidated several provisions of an Arizona 
law which sought to “discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of 
aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully present in the United 
States.” Id. at 2497 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11–1051 (2012)). 
 143. Truax, 239 U.S. at 42. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. (reasoning that “in ordinary cases [immigrants] cannot live 
where they cannot work”).  
 147. Given the Court’s emphatic description of the equal protection violation 
and the promise of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment, Truax cannot be 
dismissed solely as a preemption decision masquerading under an equal 
protection label. For example, the Court reasoned  
that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the 
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and 
opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. If 
this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the 
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preemption holding, it is clear that the Court considered the 
state’s wanting authority to regulate immigration as relevant to 
its equal protection obligations.  
For example, the Court rejected the state’s purported interest 
in limiting the employment of non-citizens because only the 
federal government may determine the standards under which 
migrants may lawfully work.148 The Court reasoned that the 
state’s power “to make reasonable classifications in legislating to 
promote the health, safety, morals and welfare” did not empower 
it “to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or 
nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood.”149 The 
Court held that Arizona had acted beyond its police power 
authority to reach the subjects of immigration lawmaking and 
thus could not justify its action under the Equal Protection 
Clause.150  
Truax predates many of the Court’s landmark decisions 
establishing the contours of modern equal protection doctrine, 
including United States v. Carolene Products.151 But elements of 
this ultra vires approach persisted in the Court’s later alienage 
cases. For example, in 1977, in Nyquist v. Mauclet,152 the Court 
approached federalism concerns in a similar manner, striking 
down on equal protection grounds a New York statute that made 
citizenship an eligibility requirement for state tuition assistance. 
There, the Court rejected New York’s claim that it could exclude 
legal residents from access to financial aid to incentivize 
noncitizens to naturalize.153 The Court concluded that New York 
did not present a “permissible” state purpose because 
                                                                                                     
prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the 
laws would be a barren form of words.  
Id. at 41. 
 148. See id. at 43 (reasoning that the Court must consider whether 
“underlying the classification is the authority to deal with that at which the 
legislation is aimed”). 
 149. Id. at 41. 
 150. See id. at 42–43 (“The authority to control immigration—to admit or 
exclude aliens—is vested solely in the Federal Government.”). 
 151. 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
 152. 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 153. See id. at 10 (“Control over immigration and naturalization is entrusted 
exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State has no power to interfere.”). 
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immigration control and the authority to regulate naturalization 
“is entrusted exclusively to the Federal Government, and a State 
has no power to interfere.”154 
This ultra vires approach considers federalism as a “legal 
tool” to discern improper government motives and unjust 
treatment; it does not serve as a means of negotiating the 
relationship between the federal government and the states at 
the expense immigrants’ rights.155 In this sense, it operates much 
like the Court’s recognition of suspect classifications and 
application of strict scrutiny,156 but with attention to the entity 
alleged to have discriminated. That is, instead of focusing on the 
qualities of the recipient of discrimination that renders a 
government classification suspect, it focuses on the 
characteristics of the government discriminating to discern 
whether its regulation of subjects beyond its reach reveals an 
invidious purpose.  
Moreover, the ultra vires approach ensures that structural 
concerns do not supplant rights in equal protection doctrine 
involving alienage status because it has the advantage of working 
in only one direction. Concluding that the government has no 
authority to regulate a specific area such that its action is ultra 
vires serves as a good proxy for whether or not the state has 
classified in an improper manner, but the reverse is not 
necessarily true. If a state has sufficient power to act with respect 
to a given subject—or acts consistently with the Federal 
Government—should not resolve the equal protection inquiry, 
which must still, of course determine whether the state’s chosen 
classification is justified by a sufficient state interest.157  
                                                                                                     
 154. Id.  
 155. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 1434 (“The substantive constitutional 
command of equal protection should not be confused with the standards of 
review or other judicial ‘tests’ employed to police government compliance with 
that command.”). Gerald Neuman has criticized scholars who claim that the 
dichotomized approach to equal protection in alienage cases is illogical and 
unworkable because of the different standards. He notes that “[t]his argument 
erroneously treats ‘suspectness’ as an objective description of reality rather than 
a legal tool.” Id. at 1435. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Barannikova v. Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251, 261–62 (Conn. 1994) 
(“The fact that a state may act within a given realm provided it does not conflict 
with federal legislation, does not also imply that when so acting it may make 
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The growing influence of immigration federalism—which, 
contests the notion of an exclusive federal power over 
immigration matters, and accepts some room for state 
regulation158—complicates the simplicity of this approach to 
discerning federalism’s role in equal protection doctrine. If one 
accepts that state and federal governments share more power 
than previously acknowledged to regulate migrants, determining 
what is ultra vires is not so simple. 
B. Rights-Enhancing Immigration Policy 
A rights-enhancing theory of federal immigration authority 
provides another potential explanation for how federalism 
concerns might matter in equal protection doctrine involving 
alienage status. Under this account, migrants’ claim to equal 
treatment by the states is derivative of, or enhanced by, the 
status conferred upon them by the federal government. This 
explanation emphasizes the Federal Government’s exclusive and 
plenary authority over immigration matters and suggests that 
that sovereign’s decision to admit migrants into the country 
under federal law carries with it certain guarantees, namely, that 
the persons admitted will receive equal treatment by the states.  
This account is evident in the Court’s 1948 decision in 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,159 decided more than 
three decades after Truax. In Takahashi, the Court struck down 
a California law restricting fishing licenses to lawfully present 
migrants “ineligible for citizenship.”160 Takahashi addressed a 
specific question left open by Truax: whether a state might 
possess a special public interest in preserving certain state 
resources—there, licenses to fish in coastal waters—for citizens 
                                                                                                     
invidious distinctions without regard to the constitutional equal protection 
guarantee.”). 
 158. See Elias, supra note 10, at 705–06 (“This ‘new immigration federalism’ 
is and will be grounded in immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking, which has the 
potential to complement (as well as occasionally contradict) federal efforts at 
comprehensive immigration reform.”). 
 159. 334 U.S. 410 (1948). 
 160. Id. at 417. 
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at the expense of noncitizens.161 Although the Court 
acknowledged that California’s alienage restriction raised 
important questions of both “federal-state relationships and of 
constitutionally protected individual equality and liberty,”162 it 
opted for an equal protection rationale as the ground for 
invaliding the state measure, even as its decision once again 
focused heavily on federal exclusivity over immigration 
matters.163 It noted: 
The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in 
determining what aliens shall be admitted to the United 
States, the period they may remain, regulation of their 
conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of 
their naturalization. Under the Constitution the states are 
granted no such powers; they can neither add to nor take from 
the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon admission, 
naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States or 
the several states. State laws which impose discriminatory 
burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully 
within the United States conflict with this constitutionally 
derived federal power to regulate immigration, and have 
accordingly been held invalid.164 
The Court tethered this discussion to its equal protection 
analysis partly through an ultra vires analysis of state 
regulation. The Court reasoned that federal exclusivity over 
immigration matters “emphasize[d] the tenuousness of the state’s 
claim that it has power to single out and ban its lawful alien 
inhabitants.”165 
                                                                                                     
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 414–15. 
 163. Id. at 419. The Court later exhibited an openness, in spite of 
Takahashi’s equal protection holding, to recast it as a preemption decision. In 
Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), the Court acknowledged “the actual basis for 
invalidation of the California statute was apparently the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution.” Id. at 11 n.16. But it noted “pre-emption played a 
significant role in the Court’s analysis,” citing the work of two commentators 
who claimed that “many of the Court’s decisions concerning alienage 
classifications, such as Takahashi, are better explained in pre-emption than in 
equal protection terms.” Id. (citing Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A 
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1060–65 (1979); Levi, 
supra note 21). 
 164. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419 (citation omitted).  
 165. Id. at 420. The Court also rejected the notion that the state could coopt 
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But Takahashi also relied upon a separate, rights-enhancing 
theory of federal immigration power to justify its equal protection 
holding. The Court suggested that the Federal Government’s 
decision to grant lawfully present immigrants the right to enter 
and live in the country effectively triggers migrants’ claim to 
equal treatment by the states.166 Citing Truax, the Court 
explained that in that case Arizona’s attempt to suppress the 
employment of noncitizens was invalid because “having been 
lawfully admitted into the country under federal law,” the 
plaintiff “had a federal privilege to enter and abide in any State 
in the Union and thereafter under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
enjoy the equal protection of the laws of the state in which he 
abided.”167  
The rights-enhancing theory of federalism treats 
congressional policy as a gatekeeper to Fourteenth Amendment 
rights, allowing Congress to decide who has claims to such 
rights.168 But long before Takahashi, as well as after, the Court 
has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as applying to “all 
persons” within the United States, regardless of their 
immigration status.169 In other contexts, the Court has also 
                                                                                                     
federal classifications and put them to use for its own purposes. Id. The Court 
reasoned that “the power of a state to apply its laws exclusively to its alien 
inhabitants as a class is confined within narrow limits” whereas Congress has 
“broad and wholly distinguishable powers over immigration and naturalization.” 
Id.  
 166. Id. at 415–16 (citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915)). 
 167. Id. (quotation omitted). 
 168. For similar reasons, scholars have noted the inadequacy of preemption 
as a substitute for equal protection analysis: It removes migrants’ fair treatment 
from the concerns of constitutional equality to the domain of policymaking. See 
Koh, supra note 38, at 97 (explaining the inadequacies of preemption as a 
substitute for equal protection in cases involving discrimination against 
noncitizens); Bosniak, supra note 96, at 255 (suggesting that federalism and the 
Supremacy Clause concern “institutional process” or “who decides” and not who 
are the “the rightful subjects of equality”).  
 169. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (recognizing that 
noncitizens are “persons” within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1987) (rejecting the state’s argument “that 
undocumented aliens, because of their immigration status, are not ‘persons 
within the jurisdiction’ of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no 
right to the equal protection of Texas law”). 
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turned back congressional attempts to dictate Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.170 
That said, a federalism theory recognizing that Congress 
may enhance migrants’ claims to equal treatment under the 
Constitution complements the Court’s view of legislative power 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a one-way 
ratchet: Congress is empowered to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment to achieve its remedial purposes, but cannot act to 
restrict its reach.171 The ratchet theory, however, is not a perfect 
analogy for this potential role of federalism in equal protection 
cases involving alienage-status. When the federal government 
grants or restrict immigrants license to enter or remain within 
the country, it is not enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, nor 
even the slightest bit interested in remedying the inequality and 
institutionalized racism that led to the Amendment’s enactment. 
Rather, when the Executive exercises its plenary immigration 
authority in this way, the federal government is making policy 
choices based upon such variables as economic conditions, 
political concerns, and foreign affairs. 
A rights-enhancing view of federal immigration authority 
thus invites the result that the economic and political vagaries of 
federal immigration policy will dictate the scope of state equal 
protection obligation.172 And in many instances, federal 
immigration policy often does not enhance the standing of 
migrants under the Fourteenth Amendment. As others have 
                                                                                                     
 170. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997) (striking down the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as exceeding Congress’s enforcement 
power under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment, stating that “[i]f Congress 
could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, 
no longer would the Constitution be ‘superior paramount law, unchangeable by 
ordinary means’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803))). 
 171. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (stating that § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is a “positive grant of legislative power” for 
Congress to pass legislation that “secure[s] the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”); see also Guttentag, supra note 14, at 45 (arguing that 
immigration preemption doctrine should take full account of federal policy 
grounded in the Civil Rights Act of 1870 that immigrants receive equal 
treatment).  
 172. Indeed, many of the lower courts that have upheld alienage-based cuts 
to public benefits and professional opportunities have held just that. Infra Part 
III. 
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noted, the assumption that the federal government is more 
protective of immigrant rights than the states over-simplifies the 
complex nature of federal immigration regulation and, in many 
instances, is simply inaccurate.173 A theory that injects 
federalism into equal protection analysis involving state 
treatment of immigrants in this way could therefore invite 
doctrinal inconsistency and confusion.  
For example, if a rights-enhancing theory of federal 
immigration law explains the result in Graham, it makes the 
Court’s decision in Mathews, five years later, much harder to 
reconcile. If state measures imposing burdens upon immigrants 
are closely scrutinized because they effectively deny “entrance 
and abode,” as Takahashi put it,174 and therefore conflict with the 
federal government’s decision to admit such immigrants to 
permanent residence under an equality of legal privileges, then 
Congress’s decision to deny lawful permanent residents federal 
Medicare benefits would seem similarly inconsistent with its own 
decision to grant certain migrants permanent residence. Perhaps 
Mathews merely solidifies that within the Court’s sweeping 
deference to the federal government’s immigration regulations 
the Court will not second-guess even inconsistent policy choices. 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Gerken, supra note 137, at 46 (citing traditional nationalist 
perspective in federalism scholarship that “local power is a threat to minority 
rights”). Other scholars have contested the assumption that the federal 
government is more protective of immigrants than the states. See, e.g., 
Rodríguez, supra note 10, at 570–71 (criticizing scholarly debates about 
immigration federalism as “currently framed” because they “largely have 
focused on whether the national government or the states will be better at 
protecting or advancing immigrants’ interests”). But see Johnson, supra note 11, 
at 618–19 (describing the “long history of state and local laws that discriminate 
against immigrants” and arguing that, while “civil rights concerns [do not] 
disappear from the field just because the federal government is regulating 
immigration, . . . the potential civil rights deprivations at the state and local 
levels are likely to be greater because of the fact that nativist and racist 
sentiments are more likely to prevail”). 
 174. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948) (quoting 
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42 (1915)). 
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C. Congressional Imprimatur for State Discrimination 
It is clear as a matter of preemption doctrine that courts do 
not cloak state laws which adopt federal immigration 
classifications as their own with a presumption of legitimacy, 
based upon imputed congressional endorsement of the 
regulation.175 On the contrary, under the Supremacy Clause, the 
Court considers whether Congress intended to occupy the field of 
regulation or whether a seemingly harmonious state law might, 
nevertheless, frustrate Congress’s purpose.176 In the equal 
protection context, however, the Court has not been as clear 
about the extent to which federal immigration policy—
particularly with respect to undocumented migrants—might 
provide an imprimatur of legitimacy to state laws that 
discriminate against noncitizens. 
On the one hand, in Plyler v. Doe,177 the Court invalidated 
under equal protection a Texas law that denied free public school 
education to undocumented children, in part by reasoning that 
the plaintiffs’ presence in the United States in violation of federal 
law did not justify the state’s discrimination. But on the other 
hand, the Court noted that migrants’ unlawful presence is 
constitutionally relevant to the scope of their equal protection 
rights.178 Specifically, the Court rejected Texas’s position that 
                                                                                                     
 175. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502–03 (2012) (striking 
down under the Supremacy Clause an Arizona law that created an alien 
registration requirement, even where Arizona argued that “the provision had 
the same aim as federal law and adopts its substantive standards”). The Court 
reasoned that the provision’s purported harmony with congressional 
immigration policy did not save it from preemption given the “basic premise of 
field preemption—States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal 
Government has reserved for itself.” Id. at 2502. 
 176. See generally Lauren Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption 
and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 159 
(2012) (describing the various forms of federal preemption). 
 177. 457 U.S. 202, 226 (1982). 
 178. Id. at 219, 224–26. Here, the Court’s analysis reads very much like a 
preemption decision and cites De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), in which 
the Court upheld a California restriction on the employment of noncitizens as 
consistent with the Supremacy Clause. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225–26. The Court 
stated:  
As we recognized in De Canas v. Bica, the States do have some 
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Congress had provided an “imprimatur” of legitimacy to the 
state’s discrimination because, in contrast to the legally present 
migrants in Takahashi, Congress had not admitted the 
undocumented children “on an equality of legal privileges with all 
citizens under non-discriminatory laws.”179 Yet, the Court 
accepted that congressional policy might modulate a state’s equal 
protection obligations, stating that in any equal protection 
challenge involving “the treatment of aliens, . . . courts must be 
attentive to congressional policy,” for “the exercise of 
congressional power might well affect the State’s prerogatives to 
afford differential treatment to a particular class of aliens.”180  
Although the Court did not provide much guidance on when 
congressional policy might bolster a state’s authority to 
discriminate against noncitizens, Plyler suggests that the policy 
in question must be directly related to the discriminatory state 
classification employed. There, the Court rejected Texas’s 
position, noting an absence of federal law and policy “concerning 
the State’s authority to deprive [undocumented] children of an 
education.”181 
Yet, even the Court’s limited endorsement of this theory of 
federalism’s role in equal protection doctrine is ambivalent. While 
accepting that congressional policy “might well affect the State’s 
                                                                                                     
authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such 
action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal. 
In De Canas, the State’s program reflected Congress’ intention to bar 
from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of 
permission to work in this country. In contrast, there is no indication 
that the disability imposed by § 21.031 corresponds to any 
identifiable congressional policy. The State does not claim that the 
conservation of state educational resources was ever a congressional 
concern in restricting immigration. More importantly, the 
classification reflected in § 21.031 does not operate harmoniously 
within the federal program.  
Id. (quotation omitted). 
 179. Id. at 224 (quoting Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420). The Court reasoned 
that congressional “disapproval of the presence of these children within the 
United States, and the evasion of the federal regulatory program that is the 
mark of undocumented status” did not provide Texas with “authority for its 
decision to impose upon them special disabilities.” Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 224–25. 
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prerogatives to afford differential treatment,”182 the Court 
simultaneously walked back slightly from that statement, 
acknowledging that “[i]f the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection was available only to those upon whom Congress 
affirmatively granted its benefit, the State’s argument would be 
virtually unanswerable.”183 The Court reasoned that the “Equal 
Protection Clause operates of its own force to protect anyone 
‘within [the State’s] jurisdiction’ from the State’s arbitrary 
action.”184  
To be sure, the disconnect between the Court’s holding and 
its statement regarding the “relevance” to equal protection 
analysis of a migrant’s status under federal immigration law was 
partly driven by its exceptional facts. Dissenting in Plyler, Chief 
Justice Burger accused the Court of treating plaintiffs as a 
quasi-suspect class given their status as children and their 
interest in education as a quasi-fundamental right.185 Plyler, 
nevertheless, provides a doctrinal opening for the inverse of a 
rights-enhancing theory of federal immigration policy to take 
shape. 186  
                                                                                                     
  182. Id. at 224. 
 183. Id. at 225 n.21. 
 184. Id.  
 185. See id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for 
“patching together bits and pieces of what might be termed quasi-suspect-class 
and quasi-fundamental-rights analysis” to “spin[ ]out a theory custom-tailored 
to the facts of these cases”). 
 186. The dissent in Plyler endorses Takahashi’s rights-enhancing view of 
federalism, including its inevitable inverse. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 246 
n.7 (1982) (Burger, J., dissenting)  
[S]tate discrimination against legally resident aliens conflicts with 
and alters “the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress upon 
admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United States 
or the several states” . . . [but] the same cannot be said when 
Congress has decreed that certain aliens should not be admitted to 
the United States at all.  
(quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948)). 
Whether a state’s equal protection obligations ought to be modulated when a 
regulation affects undocumented immigrants—or, put another way, when is 
undocumented status constitutionally relevant to equal protection rights and to 
what degree—is beyond the scope of this Article. But, of course, the issue bears 
upon the rights of lawfully present immigrants, particularly if one accepts, as 
many courts recently have, that federalism matters to state equal protection 
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D. Dissimilarly Situated by Immigration Policy 
Federal immigration policy might also impact equal 
protection analysis of state alienage classifications, if courts view 
migrants’ status under federal law as relevant to whether they 
are similarly situated to their citizen counterparts. Graham 
emphasized that legal residents are similarly situated to citizens 
for most state legislative purposes,187 citing their shared right to 
work, obligation to pay taxes, and eligibility to be drafted,188 but 
without crediting these attributes of group membership—which 
result from federal policy choices—directly to federalism 
concerns. Nevertheless, in emphasizing attributes derivative to a 
migrants’ status under federal law, Graham effectively obliged 
Plyler to hold that undocumented migrants’ different status 
under federal law was not a “constitutional irrelevancy.”189 
In the end, to focus on whether migrants are similarly 
situated to citizens may really be asking something more 
fundamental: as Linda Bosniak has put it, when does citizenship 
matter?190 Is it only when the federal government regulates entry 
                                                                                                     
obligations based upon a rights-enhancing view of federal immigration policy. 
See infra Part III.D (addressing Fifth and Sixth Circuit decisions upholding 
state laws imposing burdens upon lawfully present nonimmigrants based upon 
the theory that unlike lawful permanent residents Congress has not admitted 
nonimmigrants to the United States under an equality of legal privileges). Plyler 
is one example where undocumented immigrants’ unauthorized presence in the 
United States was not determinative of this group’s equal protection rights. But 
it has not provided a strong basis to protect undocumented migrants from state 
discrimination in other contexts. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: 
Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1734 (2010) 
(“So far, history has shown Plyler to be a high-water mark, and not a decision 
that prompted a new era in equal protection for unauthorized migrants 
generally.”).  
 187. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(reasoning that Graham recognized that lawfully present noncitizens are 
similarly situated to citizens “for most legislative purposes,” such that 
distinctions drawn on the basis of alienage-status are likely to reflect historic 
“antipathy” toward immigrants).  
 188. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971). 
 189. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (declining to recognize 
undocumented immigrants as a suspect class). 
 190. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1148 (stating that courts will continue to 
be called upon to determine the “significance of the status of alienage—
THE PREEMPTING OF EQUAL PROTECTION 125 
and exit to the United States and who can vote and participate in 
state political functions? Or can it matter when the states enact 
measures disadvantaging immigrants with respect to state 
resources and economic opportunities?  
E. Preemption Instead 
Federalism principles play the most decisive role in equal 
protection cases involving immigrants when courts opt not to 
address alleged equal protection violations at all and instead 
invalidate laws on the basis of the Supremacy Clause. Since 
Plyler, the Supreme Court has often utilized preemption to 
evaluate state restrictions based upon alienage.191 As Kerry 
Abrams has argued, the preemption focus is not surprising, at 
least in the case of undocumented migrants, as it “substitutes for 
the lack of an equal protection doctrine that adequately protects” 
that group from discrimination.192 But the Court has sometimes 
opted for preemption, even when the legislation at issue 
concerned lawfully present migrants.  
For example, in Toll v. Moreno,193 decided later in the same 
term as Plyler, the Supreme Court declined to address an equal 
protection question involving a University of Maryland policy 
that denied in-state tuition to lawfully present non-immigrant 
G-4 visa holders, even though citizens and lawful permanent 
                                                                                                     
including undocumented alienage—for the allocation of rights and benefits in 
our society”). 
 191. See Toll, 458 U.S. at 13 (striking down a University of Maryland policy 
that denied in-state tuition to lawfully present nonimmigrants as preempted by 
federal law); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976) (upholding a 
California law prohibiting employers from hiring undocumented workers as 
valid under the Supremacy Clause); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 
2497–98 (2012) (striking down on preemption grounds three sections of an 
Arizona statute addressed to immigration enforcement); see also Heeren, supra 
note 11, at 369–70 (suggesting that in earlier eras, the Court was more likely to 
closely address “questions of individual rights” than “structural questions” 
presented by state laws regulating migrants and noting that in Plyler, the 
“Court never addressed the preemption issue; it resolved the case on equal 
protection grounds”).  
 192.  Abrams, supra, note 10, at 601. 
 193. 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
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residents could obtain in-state tuition so long as they were 
domiciled in the State.194 The district court held that the policy 
violated equal protection and, in the alternative, was preempted 
by federal law.195 But the Supreme Court sidestepped the equal 
protection issue altogether, affirming the lower court’s decision 
exclusively on the basis of the Supremacy Clause.196 The 
concurring and dissenting opinions provide some clues as to why.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent questioned Graham’s 
continuing vitality in light of the political function exception, 
which he viewed as calling Graham’s central premise into doubt. 
That dissent provoked a spirited response from Justice 
Blackmun, Graham’s author.197 Given that friction, and the fact 
that Plyler struck down a state law disadvantaging 
undocumented immigrants, the Court was likely hesitant to 
expand Graham beyond the class of lawful permanent residents 
to those who, though lawfully present in the United States, 
constituted non-immigrant visitors.198  
                                                                                                     
 194. Id. at 3. G-4 visas applied “to nonimmigrant aliens who are officers or 
employees of certain international organizations, and to members of their 
immediate families.” Id. at 4. 
 195. Id. at 9.  
 196. Id. at 9–10. As to the Supremacy Clause, the Court concluded that 
Congress preempted Maryland’s policy of denying in-state tuition to G-4 visa 
holders on the basis of their immigration status because it specifically permitted 
that class of nonimmigrants to establish domicile in the United States and 
provided them with preferential tax treatment. Id. at 14. According to the 
Court, Maryland’s denial of in-state tuition thus amounted to “an ancillary 
burden not contemplated by Congress in admitting these aliens to the United 
States,” id. at 14 (quotation omitted), and frustrated the federal policy of 
inducing such international organizations “to locate significant operations in the 
United States” through preferential treatment. Id. at 16. 
 197. Supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also Bosniak, supra note 96, 
at 1107 n.257 (noting that in bypassing the equal protection question in Toll, 
the Supreme Court did not explain why supremacy was its preferred mode of 
analysis).  
 198. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1107 n.257 (noting “the likely 
explanation for the resort to preemption doctrine in Toll v. Moreno [is] the fact 
that the state wasn’t discriminating against permanent residents, and the Court 
wasn’t sure it wanted to extend strict scrutiny to categories of nonimmigrant 
aliens, including resident nonimmigrants” (quoting Letter from Gerald L. 
Neuman, Professor, Columbia Law School, to Author (Oct. 15, 1994) (on file with 
author))). Graham did not necessarily foreclose extension of suspect class status 
to this group; it spoke of “alienage” as a suspect class, and other decisions like 
THE PREEMPTING OF EQUAL PROTECTION 127 
Before the lower courts, the Supremacy Clause has played an 
additional role in equal protection cases, particularly those 
involving PRWORA. Specifically, courts have recognized what 
some have referred to as the “uniform rule” doctrine, 199 whereby 
state regulations targeting migrants receive the deference 
applicable to the Federal Government’s immigration 
classifications if Congress has specifically directed “the States to 
implement national immigration objectives” in a uniform 
manner.200 Courts reason that, because “the Constitution 
empowers Congress to ‘establish [a] uniform Rule of 
Naturalization,’” state action that follows a uniform immigration 
rule mandated by the federal government should also be 
considered with similar deference.201 
This doctrine originates from language in Plyler, addressing 
exclusive federal authority over immigration matters and state 
responsibility to respect the supremacy of federal immigration 
law.202 In an influential footnote, the Court first noted that the 
federal government may constitutionally employ alienage 
classifications to distinguish between individuals because such 
distinctions “may be intimately related to the conduct of foreign 
policy, to the federal prerogative to control access to the United 
States, and to the plenary federal power to determine who has 
sufficiently manifested his allegiance to become a citizen of the 
Nation.”203 Noting that “[n]o State may independently exercise a 
like power,” the Court, citing De Canas v. Bica,204 a preemption 
                                                                                                     
Takahashi, which struck down discriminatory state laws involved classifications 
against nonimmigrants like the G-4 visa holders in Toll. But the question of 
whether suspect classification status under Graham applies to nonimmigrants 
was unsettled at the time of Toll and remains so today, with the Circuit Courts 
of Appeals split on this issue. See infra Part IV.D (analyzing these federal 
decisions).  
 199. See generally, e.g., Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 
Plyler’s uniform rule language). 
 200. Aliessa ex rel Fayad v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001) (“If 
the rule were uniform, each State would carry out the same policy under the 
mandate of Congress—the only body with authority to set immigration policy.”). 
 201. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 
n.19 (1982)).  
 202. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982). 
 203. Id.  
 204. 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
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case, then clarified, however, that states do not act independently 
when they follow the mandates of the federal government 
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. The Court explained that “if 
the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it 
believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien 
subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal 
direction.”205  
What the Court had in mind when it articulated this 
principle is not entirely clear. It certainly did not spell out the 
effect on states’ equal protection obligations of “uniform rules” 
prescribed by the federal government. Nor did the Court clarify 
whether following “the federal direction” would include states 
opting, on their own accord, to follow the federal government’s 
lead, or whether it only referred to states following specific 
directives from the federal government. In the end, Plyler simply 
may have been articulating a principle of supremacy, under 
which it follows that states do not violate equal protection 
because they are constrained to follow federal immigration 
directives.206 Several lower courts, however, have expanded 
Plyler’s footnote beyond that simple meaning, upholding state 
laws adopting federal immigration classifications as their own 
under deferential rational basis review, without first concluding 
that Congress mandated a specific rule for the states to follow in 
a uniform manner.207 
                                                                                                     
 205. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19. 
 206. See generally Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976) 
(striking down federal Civil Service Commission alienage-based employment 
restriction targeting lawful permanent residents but noting the result would be 
different if the exclusion “were expressly mandated by the Congress or the 
President”); In re Adoption of a Child by L. C., 425 A.2d 686, 693 (N.J. 1981) 
(rejecting equal protection challenge to state law regulating birth certificates of 
foreign born adoptees after reasoning that “a state may deny benefits to aliens if 
the discrimination against aliens is rationally related to the state's 
constitutional obligation to avoid conflicts with federal law and imposes no 
burdens on aliens not anticipated by Congress”).  
 207. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(rejecting the view that the “federal government's imprimatur for” state 
alienage discrimination “cannot reduce the level of scrutiny to which the state's 
choice is subjected under the Equal Protection Clause” while acknowledging 
that Congress in PRWORA did not enact a uniform federal immigration policy 
and direct the states to follow it); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 884 (9th Cir. 
THE PREEMPTING OF EQUAL PROTECTION 129 
IV. The Collapse of the Equal Protection Dichotomy? 
Although the Supreme Court has never revisited Graham, in 
recent years, a number of decisions by the state courts and three 
federal circuit courts have eroded the distinction between federal 
laws classifying on the basis of alienage status and those wrought 
by the states.208 And they have done so based upon a variety of 
rationales, most of which privilege structural concerns about the 
preeminence of federal immigration policy at the expense of 
immigrants’ rights.209 
The below discussion explores the breakdown in the equal 
protection dichotomy that has long governed cases involving 
alienage status and the role of federalism concerns in that result. 
This discussion examines the post-PRWORA public benefits 
cases, as well as the federal circuit court split regarding the level 
of equal protection scrutiny applicable to laws barring temporary 
workers from professional licenses and employment 
opportunities.  
In the public benefit cases, PRWORA has driven these 
results. That law, enacted by Congress in 1996, made most 
noncitizens ineligible for means-tested federal benefits, such as 
Medicaid.210 Specifically, Congress deemed most lawful 
                                                                                                     
2014) (recognizing that PRWORA allows states “discretion to implement a plan 
for a specified category of aliens” but concluding that this “does not defeat or 
undermine uniformity” because “a state’s exercise of discretion can also 
effectuate national policy”).  
 208. See generally Soskin, 353 F.3d 1242 (applying rational basis review to 
state denial of healthcare benefits); Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 
2014) (same); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2014) (same). 
 209. See generally Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1250–54; Bruns, 750 F.3d at 69–70; 
Korab, 797 F.3d at 581. 
 210.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2012) (limiting the term “qualified alien”). 
Congress deemed persons lawfully admitted for permanent residence and other 
specified groups, such as asylees and refugees, to be “qualified aliens.” All 
persons not considered to be “qualified aliens,” such as undocumented 
immigrants, were deemed “unqualified” and thus ineligible for most federal 
benefits. Id. § 1611(a). Congress then parsed immigrants’ eligibility for federal 
means-tested benefits even further, dividing “qualified aliens” into two 
additional subgroups: those lawfully residing in the United States before August 
22, 1996, some of whom could receive federal benefits, and those who arrived 
lawfully in the United States after that date, for whom federal benefits would be 
unavailable for at least five years. Id. § 1613(a).  
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permanent residents ineligible for federal food stamps and 
Medicaid until they have possessed that status for at least five 
years.211 In doing so, Congress identified two federal interests 
sought to be furthered by PRWORA—promoting self-sufficiency 
among aliens in accordance with “national immigration policy” 
and reducing “the incentive for illegal immigration provided by 
the availability of public benefits.”212 PRWORA did not, however, 
direct a particular state practice with respect to state-funded 
benefits.  
On the contrary, Congress expressly allowed the states to 
decide for themselves whether to direct their own monies for that 
purpose and yet tried to insulate the states from the 
requirements of equal protection, and apparently Graham, should 
they choose to follow the federal government’s lead and deny 
immigrants an equal share of state resources.213 In § 1601(7) of 
PRWORA, a provision with dubious legitimacy in so far as its 
attempt to legislate the outcome of an equal protection 
analysis,214 Congress provided: “a State that chooses to follow the 
Federal classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens 
for public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the least 
restrictive means available for achieving the compelling 
governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in 
accordance with national immigration policy.”215 
Even without finding § 1601(7) dispositive, courts have relied 
upon PRWORA to shape a new equal protection jurisprudence in 
the lower courts sanctioning state discrimination against 
immigrants in the realm of public benefit access. Some courts 
have viewed PRWORA’s sanctioning of state denials of benefits as 
dispositive of the legality of state law under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.216 Other courts have attributed to federal law the 
                                                                                                     
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. § 1601(5)–(6).  
 213. Id. § 1622(a).  
 214. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (concluding it is 
exclusively for the Court, and not Congress, “to determine what constitutes a 
constitutional violation”).  
 215. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (2012).  
 216. As the Ninth Circuit put it in Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 
2014): “Even assuming arguendo that Hawaii’s discretionary decision not to 
provide optional coverage for COFA Residents constitutes alienage-based 
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inequality experienced by immigrants, even with respect to state 
resources, absolving states of any responsibility for funding half 
of citizens’ federally-subsidized benefits, while not providing 
equivalent funding to immigrants.217 And still others have viewed 
state legislation targeting immigrants for denial of healthcare 
benefits as classifications crafted in accordance with the 
monetary incentives of following the federal government’s 
discriminatory lead, and therefore based upon characteristics 
other than alienage status.218  
The below summary examines the various roles that 
federalism has played in this recent equal protection 
jurisprudence. It exposes and critiques the sometimes 
unacknowledged power of federalism concerns to trump 
immigrants’ rights to equal protection before the states.  
A. Congressionally Authorized Discrimination 
In cases arising under the Supremacy Clause, courts focus 
upon congressional intent because “the purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone in every preemption case.”219 That is, courts 
must consider whether Congress intended to occupy a field of 
regulation, the reach and meaning of its statutes, and whether its 
intent would be frustrated by state laws addressed to the same 
topic.220 The same is typically not true when evaluating the 
                                                                                                     
discrimination, that decision, which is indisputably authorized by the Welfare 
Reform Act, is subject to rational-basis review. The posture of Korab’s 
constitutional challenge—essentially a complaint about state spending—coupled 
with the legitimacy of the federal statutory framework, leads to this conclusion.” 
Id. at 582. 
 217. See generally Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1948); see also Soskin v. 
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating “the discrimination 
is Congress’s doing”). 
 218. See Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 71 (1st Cir. 2014) (concluding that 
“the state drew no distinctions on the basis of alienage” when it opted to 
participate in Medicaid and provide half of the program’s funding, without 
affording equivalent state resources to lawful permanent residents). 
 219. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. 
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, (1996)).  
 220. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) 
(analyzing congressional intent under doctrines of express, field, and conflict 
preemption and invaliding portions of Arizona law addressed to immigration 
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validity of state laws regulating migrants under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated, 
including in Graham, that Congress cannot insulate the states 
from the requirements of equal protection.221 And in Plyler, the 
Supreme Court recognized that congressional choices are not 
dispositive of states’ equal protection obligations even with 
respect to the rights of undocumented immigrants.222 
Nevertheless, after PRWORA, a number of courts grappling with 
the “the effect of Congressional authorization of state 
discrimination against aliens,” have viewed the effect of 
PRWORA as effectively altering states’ Fourteenth Amendment 
obligations to legal permanent residents. 
Specifically, in Soskin, the Tenth Circuit deemed PRWORA 
as dispositive of the constitutional inquiry,223 in contravention of 
Graham’s recognition that Congress may not authorize a state’s 
discrimination or immunize the state from the requirements of 
                                                                                                     
enforcement); Gilbert, supra note 176, at 159 (describing the various forms of 
federal preemption and the role of congressional intent). 
 221. Specifically, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court 
concluded that a congressional statute that purported to authorize state laws 
imposing durational residency requirements for welfare benefits was irrelevant 
to whether state laws adopting such restrictions violated equal protection. 
Reasoning that it was not the congressional enactment, “but only the state 
requirements which pose the constitutional question,” the Court concluded that 
“Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.” 
Id. at 641. Two years later, the Court reaffirmed that principle in Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), rejecting Arizona’s argument that its 
durational residency requirement for immigrants was constitutional because it 
was “actually authorized by federal law.” Id. at 380. The Court noted that even 
if the federal statute were “read so as to authorize discriminatory treatment of 
aliens at the option of the States . . . serious constitutional questions [would be] 
presented.” Id. at 381–82. The Court explained that although the Federal 
Government has broad power with respect to immigration, “Congress does not 
have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.” Id. (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641). 
 222. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224 (quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 
334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948). The Court reasoned that congressional “disapproval of 
the presence of these children within the United States, and the evasion of the 
federal regulatory program that is the mark of undocumented status” did not 
provide Texas with “authority for its decision to impose upon them special 
disabilities.” Id. 
 223. Id. at 1254–55. 
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equal protection.224 Indeed, the Tenth Circuit described that 
statement in Graham as a “tautological” proposition.225 In the 
court’s view, the question was “not whether Congress can 
authorize such a constitutional violation,” but rather “what 
constitutes such a violation when Congress has (clearly) 
expressed its will regarding a matter relating to aliens.”226 The 
Tenth Circuit concluded that Congress’s invitation to the states 
in PRWORA to deny benefits to lawful residents reflected an 
expression of congressional will regarding “national policy.”227 
The Court explained that when a state determines that the 
burden of providing benefits to lawful residence “is too high,” 
such that it opts to deny such coverage, “it is addressing the 
congressional concern (not just a parochial state concern) that 
‘individual aliens not burden the public benefits system.’”228 The 
First and Ninth Circuits followed Soskin’s lead and adopted this 
reasoning as well.229  
These decisions reflect a congressional imprimatur theory of 
state alienage discrimination. But there are important reasons 
why Congress cannot immunize state discrimination against a 
suspect class in this way through its own immigration policy 
decisions—that is, who may enter and remain within the United 
States. It would suggest that Congress can serve as the 
gatekeeper to constitutional rights, determining the beneficiaries 
                                                                                                     
 224. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971) (“Congress does 
not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause.” (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969))); see 
also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) (“Congress has no affirmative power 
to authorize the States to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and is implicitly 
prohibited from passing legislation that purports to validate any such 
violation.”). 
 225. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229 See generally Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (2014); see also Korab v. 
Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 887 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that Congress in PRWORA 
“has (clearly) expressed its will regarding a matter relating to aliens,” such that 
Hawaii did not violate equal protection by “merely following the federal 
direction set forth by Congress under the Welfare Reform Act” (quoting Soskin, 
353 F.3d at 1254)).  
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of such rights, all subject to change should new political leaders 
change course.  
Under preemption doctrine, the law deemed supreme 
depends upon what law is in force on the day of a court’s decision. 
But the Constitution “removes certain norms from the realm of 
ordinary politics.”230 The Fourteenth Amendment aimed to check 
majoritarian power for the benefit of vulnerable groups and its 
norm of equal treatment therefore transcends the indeterminacy 
of politics.231  
B. Structured Discrimination: “Aliens Only” Programs 
In evaluating whether state alienage classifications violate 
equal protection guarantees, a number of courts have also focused 
on whether the state has allocated public resources to citizens 
and aliens through separately named, funded, and structured 
programs. Under this approach, states do not run afoul of equal 
protection if they provide resources to citizen and immigrants 
through separate programs (some of which may be jointly funded 
by the federal government) and then simply terminate the 
“alien-only” program. 
For example, in Doe v. Commissioner of Transitional 
Assistance,232 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held 
that a six-month durational residency requirement for a state 
supplemental benefit program imposed upon immigrants 
ineligible for federal Transitional Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (TAFDC) did not violate equal protection. In the Court’s 
view, the imposition of a durational residency requirement 
uniquely upon immigrants did not unconstitutionally distinguish 
between citizens and immigrants because “the Massachusetts 
                                                                                                     
 230. See David R. Dow, The Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative 
Redistricting Cases—Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White Plaintiffs, 
81 MINN. L. REV. 1123, 1134–35 (1997) (describing equal protection guarantees 
as “constraints on the political majority's political power”).  
 231. Id. at 1134. 
 232. 773 N.E.2d 404, 410 (Mass. 2002) (applying rational basis review to 
Massachusetts’s alienage-based denial of public benefits).  
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Legislature was not required to establish the supplemental 
program” and only immigrants were eligible for it.233 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that the State 
had treated immigrants and citizens differently by partly 
financing the jointly funded TAFDC program but not providing 
similar benefits to immigrants on the same terms.234 It reasoned 
that citizens were “eligible to receive benefits from a different” 
federal program “on conditions less restrictive than those 
imposed on qualified aliens” due to federal policies and thus this 
factor was irrelevant to whether the state had enacted a 
discriminatory classification targeting immigrants.235 The court 
applied rational basis review to the state’s durational residency 
requirement, noting that the state’s choice to provide a separate 
“aliens-only” program evidenced a “clearly noninvidious intent,” 
namely, “mitigating the harm to qualified alien families” 
occasioned by the Welfare Reform Act.236 
The Connecticut Supreme Court employed similar reasoning 
in Hong Pham v. Starkowski,237 holding that the elimination of a 
state-funded medical assistance program for immigrants 
ineligible for Federal Medicaid did not “discriminate on the basis 
of alienage” where the eliminated “aliens only” program did “not 
benefit citizens as opposed to aliens.”238 The court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that the state’s decision to participate in the 
Federal Medicaid program and to thereby allocate state resources 
to fund 50% of that program for citizens without allocating 
equivalent funding to immigrants constituted differential 
treatment for purposes of equal protection.239 The court reasoned 
that the state’s treatment of immigrants under an exclusively 
state-funded program was not comparable to “the state’s 
                                                                                                     
 233. Id. at 411–15.  
 234. Id. at 414–15. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.  
 237. 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011).  
 238. See id. at 645–48 (“When a state establishes an assistance program 
that benefits only aliens, the elimination of that program does not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause simply because the state is taking a benefit away from 
aliens.”). 
 239. Id. at 639–41. 
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treatment of individuals within the separate federal Medicaid 
program, which is governed and funded substantially by a 
different government.”240  
The court distinguished Graham and the state court 
decisions that have followed it post-PRWORA on grounds that the 
programs at issue involved discrimination “within a single, state 
funded and state controlled program” providing benefits to aliens 
and citizens alike.241 The court held that Connecticut therefore 
did not discriminate on the basis of alienage and declined to 
reach what level of scrutiny should apply to such classifications 
“authorized by the federal government.”242 
Similarly, in Bruns v. Mayhew,243 the First Circuit rejected 
the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to the state’s 
termination of their state-funded medical assistance on grounds 
that the plaintiffs were not similarly situated to any other 
recipients of state funding, even though Maine administered a 
single state medical assistance program, MaineCare, that 
distributed both Federal Medicaid and exclusively state-funded 
benefits to lawful permanent residents ineligible for that federal 
program.244 The state’s joint administration of the two programs 
under the same umbrella program and the state’s funding of half 
of citizens’ federal Medicaid benefits did not alter the court’s view 
that the state’s repeal of the “aliens only” portion of that program 
did not deprive lawful immigrants “of a benefit that it continued 
to provide to citizens.”245 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pimentel v. 
Dreyfus,246 applied similar reasoning, although the federal 
program at issue, unlike those in Doe, Hong Pham, and Bruns, 
                                                                                                     
 240. See id. at 655 (reasoning that programs solely sponsored by the state 
are not comparable to programs with joint federal and state funding). 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id. at 645, 655.  
 243. See Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir. 2014) (reasoning that 
when Maine repealed the state program it did not continue to give citizens 
benefits that non-citizens no longer received). 
 244. Id. at 69–70. 
 245. See id. (reasoning that, though the programs are under the same 
“umbrella,” they are distinct because one is jointly funded by the federal 
government and the state, and the other program is exclusively state-funded). 
 246. 670 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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was not jointly funded by the state and federal government. 
Specifically, the court held that Washington’s termination of an 
exclusively state-funded food assistance program for immigrants 
who were ineligible for federal food stamp benefits did not violate 
equal protection.247 Citing the different funding sources, and 
federal control over the eligibility criteria for the federal benefits, 
the court reasoned that the affected immigrants were not 
similarly situated to citizens eligible for federal Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits.248  
In so holding, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the state’s expenditure of 50% of the administrative costs for the 
federally funded SNAP program without providing equivalent 
resources to immigrants constituted an impermissible 
classification on the basis of alienage.249 Indeed, the court opined 
that Washington’s “alien’s only” benefits program might present a 
case of reverse alienage discrimination, because the only relevant 
alienage classification at issue actually benefited immigrants; the 
state provided “no similar state program for citizens.”250 The 
court concluded that when a state repeals a law designed to level 
                                                                                                     
 247. See id. at 1109–10 (“When Washington terminated FAP, the state 
denied the plaintiff class benefits that it did not and still does not grant to 
citizens and other aliens. Thus, the difficulty with Pimentel’s claim is that she 
offers no similarly situated individuals as a foundation for her equal protection 
claim.”). 
 248. See id. at 1107 (“Since the recipients under the different programs are 
therefore not similarly situated, Pimentel may not compare former FAP 
recipients to current SNAP recipients to allege an equal protection violation.”). 
 249. Id. at 1108. Other federal courts have likewise ruled that state 
administration of federal welfare programs does not alter the deferential 
scrutiny applicable to PRWORA’s alienage eligibility restrictions for federal 
benefits. See Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 582 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining 
that state administration of a program providing pre-natal Medicaid benefits 
did not alter the rational basis review applicable to federal alienage 
restrictions); accord Aleman v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(same as to Food Stamps); City of Chi. (Alvarez) v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598, 600–
05 (7th Cir. 1999) (same as to SSI and food stamps); Rodriguez v. United States, 
169 F.3d 1342, 1346–51 (11th Cir. 1999) (same).  
 250. Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Adarand Constrs. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[R]ejecting the notion of 
‘benign classifications’ and applying strict scrutiny to all racial classifications 
irrespective of the race of the burdened or benefitted group.”)). 
138 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77 (2016) 
the playing field occasioned by Congress’s discrimination against 
aliens “it does not necessarily engage in discrimination.”251  
The Ninth Circuit at least recognized the theoretical problem 
of resolving equal protection disputes by an overly formal 
analysis of benefit programs’ structure.252 The court noted, 
“Washington could not evade strict scrutiny simply by first 
authorizing one state-funded program for citizens and certain 
aliens and another for a subclass of aliens, and then canceling the 
latter.”253 But in the case of federal SNAP benefits, however, the 
court viewed the comparison between federal food stamp benefits 
and state-funded food assistance as “faulty” because, irrespective 
of the fact that the state administered the federally funded SNAP 
benefits in the same program as the separately funded 
aliens-only program, “the two programs are, in reality, two 
separately administered programs funded by two distinct 
sovereigns.”254 For that reason, the court concluded that 
recipients of the terminated aliens-only state program were not 
similarly situated to citizens eligible for the SNAP program.255 
These varied decisions turning back equal protection 
challenges to states’ unequal allocation of state resources to legal 
residents and citizens illustrate courts’ tendency to view such 
issues with a formalism that insufficiently probes state 
responsibility for immigrants’ unequal treatment, and instead 
disproportionately credits congressional immigration 
prerogatives with the resulting inequality.  
To be sure, no theory or principle of federalism supports 
ratcheting down the scrutiny applicable to a suspect class merely 
because it is less convenient or more expensive for the states to 
provide equal treatment due to factors beyond that sovereign’s 
control. As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has 
stated, that federal policy choices makes discrimination against 
                                                                                                     
 251. Id. (quoting Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 483 
(1982) (“To be sure, the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or 
antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as embodying a 
presumptively invalid racial classification.”)).  
 252. Id. at 1006–07. 
 253. Id. at 1106. 
 254. Id. at 1107. 
 255. Id. at 1106–10. 
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noncitizens more cost-effective for the state should make no 
difference.256 
The claim that federal immigration policy renders 
immigrants dissimilarly situated from citizens in this context is 
also inconsistent with Graham’s theory of equality. For example, 
one might argue that citizens and aliens are not similarly 
situated vis a vis the states in light of their status under federal 
law, which makes citizens eligible for federal Medicaid matching 
funds without the same restrictions it imposes upon lawful 
permanent residents. But Graham treated citizens and lawful 
permanent residents similarly situated based upon their shared 
contributions and burdens of community membership,257 not a 
comparative economic assessment of what it would cost to treat 
them equally.258  
C. Alienage Classifications Recast 
Relatedly, courts have treated alienage-based restrictions on 
public benefits as classifications based upon characteristics other 
than alienage status.259 For example, in addition to upholding 
Connecticut’s denial of state-funded healthcare benefits to 
immigrants on grounds that the elimination of an “aliens only” 
benefit program did not constitute alienage discrimination, the 
                                                                                                     
 256. See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 946 
N.E.2d 1262, 1280 (Mass. 2011) (stating “that the Federal government (on 
national origin grounds) is unwilling to [finance] Commonwealth Care does not 
render the Commonwealth obligated to classify eligibility on the basis of 
national origin—it merely makes such a classification economically attractive to 
the State that is left carrying the entire burden”). 
 257. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971). 
 258. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 583 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that 
Hawaii did not engage in alienage discrimination where the plaintiff had not 
“even alleged that the state expenditures for health insurance for aliens within 
the discretionary category created by Congress are less than the state 
expenditures for health insurance for others”). But see id. at 599–600 (Clifton, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for requiring equal protection claimants to 
“demonstrate that the state [spends] less funds [per capita] than it [spends] on 
the rest of the population” as inconsistent with “bedrock equal protection 
doctrine” which does not excuse disparate treatment because it is “more 
expensive” to provide equivalent benefits to similarly situated groups of state 
residents).  
 259. Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 662–63 (Haw. 2011). 
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Hong Pham court also reasoned that Connecticut’s denial of 
healthcare funding to immigrants was at most a classification 
“based on an individual’s eligibility for federal Medicaid” 
matching funds, and not alienage status.260 
The First Circuit in Bruns v. Mayhew261 adopted similar 
reasoning, refusing to view Maine’s denial of state-funded 
medical assistance to lawful permanent residents ineligible for 
federal Medicaid as alienage discrimination.262 The court 
reasoned that “if Maine can be said to have ‘discriminated’ at all” 
by continuing to participate in the Federal Medicaid program, “it 
only did so on the basis of federal Medicaid eligibility, a benign 
classification subject to mere rational basis review.”263 
This analysis inadequately accounts for the state’s role in 
immigrants’ unequal treatment. To be sure, the federal 
government is responsible for the exclusion of immigrants from 
the Federal Medicaid program.264 Under the Supreme Court’s 
precedents, the federal government’s authority over immigration 
matters justifies that unequal treatment.265 But the same 
                                                                                                     
 260. See id. at 659 (reasoning that “[w]hen the state participates in federal 
Medicaid, it chooses to provide some state funding to assist [eligible] 
individuals . . . and not to provide funding to [ineligible] individuals” and 
immigrants are “not the only group of individuals ineligible for federal 
Medicaid”). 
 261. 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014).  
 262. Id. at 69–70.  
 263. Id. (citing Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 659); cf. Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 
F.3d 1242, 1255–56 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 264. Soskin employed similar reasoning. See 353 F.3d at 1255–56 (“A state’s 
exercise of the option to include fewer aliens in its aliens-only program, then, 
should not be treated as discrimination against aliens as compared to citizens. 
That aspect of the discrimination is Congress’s doing—by creating one program 
for citizens and a separate one for aliens.”). 
 265. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1975) (“[A] division by a State of 
the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of 
United States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a 
comparable classification by the Federal Government is a routine and normally 
legitimate part of its business.”); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) 
(“Although it is a routine and normally legitimate part of the business of the 
Federal Government to classify on the basis of alien status, and to take into 
account the character of the relationship between the alien and this country, 
only rarely are such matters relevant to legislation by a State.” (quotation 
omitted)).  
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justification does not apply to the states. And thus it is hard to 
see why—at least on the courts’ articulated theory—a state 
deserves a pass from its equal protections obligations where it 
opts into a discriminatory scheme on its own accord (albeit with 
significant financial incentives to do so), is complicit in unequal 
treatment, but does not possess the same authority for treating 
migrants dissimilarly as the federal government.266 In a state like 
Connecticut, for example, the government chose to extend $1.9 
billion of funds from state tax coffers into the Federal 
Government’s discriminatory scheme, without extending resident 
immigrants equal resources for healthcare benefits.267 Indeed, the 
courts’ characterization of the classification as “eligibility for 
federal matching funds” conflates the fiscal benefits to the states 
of singling out immigrants for termination of welfare benefits 
with the threshold question of whether the state has drawn an 
alienage-based classification by funding benefits for citizens but 
not migrants. 
Courts’ willingness to view states’ discriminatory spending 
on healthcare benefits as benign classifications based upon the 
availability of federal matching funds is probably best explained 
by judges’ unstated intuition that it seems unreasonable to hold 
the federal government to one standard, but then expect fairer 
treatment from the states with respect to the same kind of public 
benefits.268 But that intuition is in direct opposition to the 
longstanding rationale of the equal protection dichotomy. This 
strand of the new equal protection jurisprudence involving 
alienage status thus exposes a burgeoning break down of what 
once appeared to be well-settled doctrinal silos of federal and 
state alienage classifications.  
*** 
Under each of these approaches, the supplanting of 
Fourteenth Amendment antidiscrimination norms with a 
                                                                                                     
 266. Supra note 265.  
 267. Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Haw. 2011). 
 268. The Ninth Circuit followed this rationale in Korab v. Fink, which 
reasoned that “[t]he logical corollary to the national policy that Congress set out 
in the Welfare Reform Act is that, where the federal program is constitutional, 
as it is here, states cannot be forced to replace the federal funding Congress has 
removed.” 797 F.3d 572, 582 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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doctrine disproportionately focused on congressional policy 
undermines Graham’s promise of equal treatment by the states. 
Or, more simply, it signals a preempting of equal protection for 
immigrants. 
A number of courts, however, have rejected these approaches 
and, post-PRWORA, followed Graham’s mandate to apply strict 
scrutiny to state alienage classifications.269 Significantly, courts 
have invalidated state laws both denying immigrants access to 
exclusively state-funded programs that previously benefitted 
noncitizens and citizens alike,270 and laws eliminating exclusively 
state-funded “aliens-only” programs where the state continued to 
partly fund federal benefits for citizens.271 
For example, in Aliessa v. Novello,272 in holding that New 
York’s termination of state-funded medical benefits to lawfully 
present immigrants based upon their immigration status violated 
the equal protection guarantees of the New York and federal 
constitutions, the New York Court of Appeals rejected the state’s 
claim that New York’s decision to terminate certain legal 
residents from the program implemented federal immigration 
policy and should thus “be evaluated under the less stringent 
‘rational basis’ standard.” The court recognized that if Congress 
specifically directed “the States to implement national 
immigration objectives” in a uniform manner, a state alienage 
classification might be properly considered under rational basis 
review because “the Constitution empowers Congress to ‘establish 
[a] uniform Rule of Naturalization.’”273 But in the court’s view, 
                                                                                                     
 269. See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch II), 
959 N.E.2d 970, 981 (Mass. 2012) (stating that the Commonwealth may not 
“lean on Federal policy as a crutch to absolve it of examining whether its own 
invidious discrimination is truly necessary”); Finch v. Commonwealth Health 
Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 946 N.E.2d 1262, 1280 (Mass. 2011) (applying 
strict scrutiny to the state’s benefits program). 
 270. See Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098 (N.Y. 2001) (striking 
down New York’s alienage-based allocation of exclusively state-funded 
healthcare benefits). 
 271. See Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220, 1227 (Md. 2006) (striking down 
Maryland’s termination of exclusively state-funded health care benefits for 
immigrants ineligible for federal benefits, while continuing to jointly fund 
federal benefits for citizens). 
 272. 754 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2001).  
 273. Id. at 1096 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 and Plyler v. Doe, 457 
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PRWORA did not constitute a uniform rule of federal 
immigration policy because it authorized states to choose for 
themselves whether to provide state-funded benefits to 
immigrants, thereby inviting “potentially wide variation” in state 
practice.274  
In Ehrlich v. Perez275 and Finch v. Commonwealth Health 
Ins. Connector Auth.,276 the highest courts of Maryland and 
Massachusetts concluded that the respective states violated equal 
protection where they allocated resources to fund federal 
Medicaid benefits for citizens and lawful residents who satisfied 
PRWORA’s five year bar but terminated state healthcare benefits 
for certain legal residents ineligible for federal Medicaid by virtue 
of their immigration status. The courts found equal protection 
violations where the differential treatment challenged by the 
plaintiffs consisted of the states financing part of federally 
subsidized benefits for citizens while eliminating a supplemental, 
exclusively state-funded “aliens only” program.277 Both decisions 
thus eschewed a formalistic analysis of the states’ equal 
                                                                                                     
U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982)).  
 274. See id. at 1098 (“If the rule were uniform, each State would carry out 
the same policy under the mandate of Congress—the only body with authority to 
set immigration policy.”). Unlike the other recent cases in which courts have 
upheld state laws excluding legal residents from public benefits programs, the 
program at issue in Aliessa provided exclusively state-funded coverage to both 
citizens and aliens alike who did not qualify for Federal Medicaid. Id. at 1092. 
As a result, the differential treatment challenged by the plaintiffs could not be 
dismissed as the result of a separate, federally directed program, and New 
York’s classification ran directly afoul of Graham. Cf. Krhapunskiy v. Doar, 909 
N.E.2d 70, 76–77 (N.Y. 2009) (concluding New York’s failure to provide state 
funding to ameliorate the effects of PRWORA did not violate the requirement of 
equal protection). While Aliessa might, therefore, be dismissed as the most 
straightforward application of Graham post-PRWORA, other state courts have 
not cabined its reasoning to exclusively stated-funded benefit programs. 
Ehrlich, 908 A.2d at 1227. 
 275. 908 A. 2d 1220, 1243–44 (Md. 2006). 
 276. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d 970, 973 (Mass. 2012); Finch I, 946 N.E.2d 1262, 
1280 (Mass. 2011).  
 277. See Ehrlich, 908 A.2d at 1227 (“Although the Maryland State Medicaid 
program, along with federal funds, provides the same medical services as 
available under the Welfare Innovation Act to both citizens and 
residents, . . . this new provision is limited to those aliens for whom federal 
Medicaid eligibility was eliminated by the Welfare Reform Act.”). 
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protection obligations and instead focused on the state’s decision 
to partially fund benefits for citizens through federal programs 
while eliminating funding for lawful permanent residents 
through separate state programs and appropriations.  
D. Lawfully Present Without Equality 
Another fault-line where federalism considerations are 
casting a long shadow in equal protection jurisprudence involves 
the rights of lawfully present non-immigrants to equal treatment 
by the states. While there is currently consensus among three 
federal courts of appeals that rational basis review should apply 
to state laws denying public benefits to lawful permanent 
residents after PRWORA, the circuits are split as to whether 
Graham mandates strict scrutiny when states enact laws limiting 
nonimmigrants’278 access to employment opportunities, drivers’ 
licenses, and professional licenses.279 In spite of the divergent 
outcomes, like the PRWORA cases, here too, federalism concerns 
have dominated the equal protection discussion.  
Specifically, the Second Circuit and Fifth Circuit disagree 
about whether strict scrutiny under Graham applies to laws that 
discriminate against temporary, but lawfully present, 
non-immigrants.280 In LeClerc v. Webb,281 the Fifth Circuit upheld 
                                                                                                     
 278. Immigration law classifies migrants as immigrants (those admitted for 
permanent residence) and nonimmigrants who “are admitted to the United 
States only for the duration of their status” and must state “they have ‘no 
intention of abandoning’ their countries of origin and do not intend to seek 
permanent residence in the United States.” LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418–
19 (5th Cir. 2005).  
 279. Compare id. at 420 (applying rational basis review to uphold Louisiana 
law barring nonimmigrants from taking the bar exam), and LULAC v. 
Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 535–36 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying rational basis review 
to Tennessee law barring nonimmigrants from obtaining driver licenses), with 
Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 75 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting “the rationale of 
the Fifth and Sixth Circuits” and applying strict scrutiny to Connecticut law 
excluding nonimmigrants from being pharmacists). 
 280. Supra note 279. 
 281. See 419 F.3d at 417–18 (distinguishing lawful permanent residents 
from nonimmigrants, stating that unlike the former, nonimmigrants are not 
“legally entrenched within American society” given their short term permission 
to remain and need not be recognized as a discrete and insular minority). 
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a Louisiana Supreme Court rule rendering lawfully present 
graduates of foreign law schools—many here on temporary 
worker and student visas—ineligible to take the Louisiana Bar 
exam in the face of an equal protection challenge. The court held 
that rational basis review applied to Louisiana’s citizenship 
eligibility requirement for the bar exam because Graham and a 
later Supreme Court decision, In re Griffiths,282 were not 
controlling.283 In re Griffiths applied Graham and held that 
Connecticut’s exclusion of lawful permanent residents from bar 
admissions violated the requirements of equal protection.284 
Departing from those precedents, the Fifth Circuit reasoned 
that the Constitution imposes different equal protection 
obligations upon the states with respect to lawful permanent 
residents and temporary, but also lawfully present, foreign 
residents.285 
The court reasoned that the U. S. Supreme Court has never 
strictly scrutinized a state alienage classification other than 
those disadvantaging lawful permanent residents.286 And in the 
Fifth Circuit’s view, the Court in Griffiths emphasized that 
lawful permanent residents “share essential benefits and 
burdens of citizenship in a way that aliens with lesser legal 
status do not.”287 It noted that, in addressing equal protection 
challenges to state laws burdening other classes of immigrants, 
including non-immigrant aliens or undocumented immigrants, 
“the Court has either foregone Equal Protection analysis” 
                                                                                                     
 282. See 413 U.S. 717, 726–27 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny and striking 
down under the Equal Protection Clause a Connecticut law barring lawful 
permanent residents from taking the bar exam). 
 283. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2005) (reasoning 
that In re Griffiths’ rationale was limited to resident aliens, and did not apply to 
nonimmigrants). 
 284. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 726–27. 
 285. See LaClerc, 419 F.3d at 410 (noting that “the level of constitutional 
protection afforded nonimmigrant aliens is different from that possessed by 
permanent resident aliens”). 
 286. See id. at 415–16 (stating that “the Supreme Court has reviewed with 
strict scrutiny only state laws affecting permanent resident aliens” and has held 
that “‘not all limitations on aliens are suspect’” (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 
U.S. 291, 294 (1978))).  
 287. Id. at 415.  
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altogether, as in Toll v. Moreno,288 and De Canas v. Bica,289 
which both addressed state alienage laws solely under the 
Supremacy Clause, or applied “a modified rational basis review,” 
as in Plyler v. Doe.290 
Federalism, specifically a rights-enhancing theory of federal 
immigration policy, was central to the Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoning.291 The court noted that the Supreme Court’s 
“fundamental rationale” for applying strict scrutiny to state laws 
affecting lawful permanent residents was a structural one: that 
the states “‘took position[s] seemingly inconsistent with the 
congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent 
residence.’”292 The court suggested that the same conflict with 
federal immigration policy is not at stake when states regulate 
non-immigrants, who do not benefit from the same rights-
enhancing offer of permanent residence.293 
LeClerc further reasoned that the Supreme Court applied 
strict scrutiny to state laws classifying on the basis of alienage 
status in part based upon permanent residents’ political 
powerlessness and similarity to citizens.294 In the court’s view, 
nonimmigrants lack this same peculiar position that juxtaposes 
vulnerability with rights and responsibilities.295 The Fifth Circuit 
                                                                                                     
 288. See 458 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1982) (invalidating a University of Maryland 
policy denying in-state tuition to nonimmigrants on Supremacy Clause grounds, 
after declining to consider the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claims).  
 289. See 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976) (upholding a California law prohibiting 
employment of undocumented workers on Supremacy Clause grounds). 
 290. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 416 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that in 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982), the Court concluded that the “the 
immigration status of the affected class of aliens precluded use of either 
intermediate or strict scrutiny review”). 
 291. Id. at 423–25. 
 292. Id. (quoting Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978)).  
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 417–18. 
 295. See id. (reasoning that because of their temporary status, 
nonimmigrant aliens lack a similar connection to American society, as evidenced 
by the requirement that they stipulate before entry that they do not intend to 
abandon their native citizenship). Moreover, the court found that as a class 
nonimmigrants are not discrete or insular because wide variation exists among 
nonimmigrants’ admission status. Id. at 417. In his dissent, Judge Stewart took 
issue with this reasoning, contending that the Court’s decisions in Graham and 
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reaffirmed its holding in LeClerc six years later in Van Staden v. 
St. Martin,296 applying rational basis review and upholding a 
Louisiana statute that made lawfully present non-immigrants 
ineligible to work as licensed practical nurses.297 
In LULAC v. Bredsen298 the Sixth Circuit closely followed the 
Fifth Circuit’s approach in a case challenging Tennessee’s denial 
of drivers’ licenses to lawfully present non-citizens.299 The court 
applied rational basis review, citing the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning 
that Graham does not apply beyond the class of lawful 
permanent residents and that temporary, nonpermanent 
residents are dissimilar from citizens in constitutionally 
significant ways.300  
In addition, the court cited the Fifth Circuit’s federalism 
justification for cabining Graham and its progeny to lawful 
permanent residents, noting that when states discriminate 
against LPRs they are taking a position “seemingly inconsistent 
with the congressional determination to admit the alien to 
permanent residence.”301 But the Sixth Circuit added an 
additional structural justification for applying a more deferential 
                                                                                                     
its progeny apply to all lawfully present “aliens” as a class and strict scrutiny 
did not turn on “aliens’ ability to serve in the Armed Forces or pay taxes.” Id. at 
428–29. 
 296. 664 F.3d 56 (2011). 
 297. See id. at 61 (accepting as a rational justification for the law that it 
“seeks to protect Louisiana residents from LPN’s who may have previously left 
the jurisdiction to avoid the Board's disciplinary controls on the profession”). 
 298. 500 F.3d 523 (2007). 
 299. See id. at 523–33 (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s distinction between 
permanent resident aliens who are “legally entrenched in society” and 
nonimmigrant aliens who are admitted to the United States for a durational 
period). 
 300. Id. at 533. As in LeClerc, LULAC included a strong dissent. Circuit 
Judge Ronald Lee Gilman criticized the majority for failing to acknowledge the 
extensive criticism of the LeClerc opinion, including dissents from both the 
initial appellate decision and the narrow 8–7 decision declining en banc review. 
LULAC, 500 F.3d at 539–42 (Gilman, J., dissenting). He further chided the 
majority for treating the absence of Supreme Court precedent extending 
Graham to nonimmigrants as a reason to read that decision’s clear holding 
declaring aliens a suspect class in a narrow manner. Id. at 542–43. 
 301. Id. at 533 (majority opinion) (quoting LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 
417 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted)). 
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scrutiny to laws discriminating on the basis of nonimmigrant 
status: In the court’s view, Tennessee’s law not only was 
consistent with federal law, it actually “mirrors it.”302 The court 
explained that the challenged law “merely serves to deny state-
issued proof of identification to any alien whose presence the 
federal government has refrained from permanently authorizing, 
so as to avoid the appearance that the State of Tennessee is 
vouching for his or her identity.”303 In fact, the court 
characterized the state’s classification as “directly derivative of 
aliens’ status under immigration law.”304 The court was candid 
that federalism concerns were significant to its reasoning, noting, 
in response to the dissent, that its “more deferential approach to 
Tennessee’s legislative judgment” was “born of due respect for 
principles of federalism and comity.”305 
The Second Circuit, also emphasizing principles of 
federalism, reached the opposite result in Dandamudi v. Tisch.306 
There, the court deemed Graham controlling and applied strict 
scrutiny to invalidate a New York law that made lawful 
permanent resident status or citizenship a requirement to work 
as a pharmacist within that state, thereby excluding lawfully 
                                                                                                     
 302. Id.  
 303. Id. 
 304. See id. at 534 (describing how the state law was the “mirror image” of 
federal law). 
 305. Id. at 534 n.8. In another case involving lawfully present immigrants’ 
access to drivers’ licenses, Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 
1053 (2014), the Ninth Circuit avoided deciding what level of scrutiny applies to 
state classifications targeting recipients of work authorization pursuant to 
President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, 
agreeing with the lower court that Arizona’s decision to deny DACA recipients 
drivers’ licenses was “likely to fail even rational basis review.” Id. at 1065. The 
Ninth Circuit, however characterized the Supreme Court precedent as not 
limiting strict scrutiny to lawful permanent residents. Rather, the court noted 
that “the Supreme Court has consistently required the application of strict 
scrutiny to state action that discriminates against noncitizens authorized to be 
present in the United States.” Id. at 1065 n.4 (citing Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 
U.S. 1 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & 
Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)).  
 306. See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 78 (2012) (“We see no reason to 
create an exception to the Supreme Court’s precedent that would result in such 
illogical results that clearly contradict the federal government’s determination 
as to which individuals have a legal right to be here.”). 
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present non-immigrants like the plaintiff.307 The court declined to 
view Graham and its progeny as limited to lawful permanent 
residents, reasoning that the Supreme Court affirmed a “general 
principle that alienage is a suspect classification.”308  
Once again, federalism concerns influenced the court’s equal 
protection reasoning.309 Specifically, the court reasoned that the 
state regulatory scheme sought “to prohibit some legally admitted 
aliens from doing the very thing the federal government indicated 
they could do when they came to the United States—work.”310 
Citing Takahashi, the court further reasoned that New York had 
not only treated two groups of similarly situated residents 
differently, but had effectively “drive[n] from the state 
nonimmigrants who have federal permission to enter the United 
States to work.”311  
In sum, all of the courts that have evaluated non-immigrants’ 
right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment have 
focused on federalism concerns, but with divergent results. The 
Fifth and Sixth Circuits have viewed federal immigration policy 
broadly, ascribing to Congress a policy of providing 
nonimmigrants with a lesser status with fewer rights than lawful 
permanent residents.312 In contrast, the Second Circuit focused 
                                                                                                     
 307. See id. at 70, 74 (finding no “existing basis for distinguishing Graham's 
requirement” that state statutes distinguishing on the basis of alienage status 
“are strictly scrutinized”). 
 308. See id. at 74–75 (reasoning “that the Court has never held that lawfully 
admitted aliens are outside of Graham's protection” nor “distinguished between 
classes of legal resident aliens”).  
 309. See id. at 77 n.14 (“Certainly the federal government, which bears the 
constitutional responsibility of regulating immigration, has much broader 
latitude to distinguish among subclasses of aliens. But this latitude does not 
give states carte blanche to do the same.”).  
 310. Id. at 69, 77. The Second Circuit separately concluded that New York’s 
law was preempted under the Supremacy Clause, but was “constrained” to 
decide the case on equal protection grounds because of the noncitizen plaintiffs’ 
standing limitations with respect to preemption challenges. Dandamudi, 686 
F.3d at 81 (citing the NAFTA Implementation Act).  
 311. See Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 81 (‘‘The assertion of an authority to deny 
to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the 
state would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance 
and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.’” 
(quoting Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948)). 
 312. See LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 533 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying 
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on a narrower aspect of federal immigration policy—Congress’s 
decision to permit nonimmigrants to work in the United States.313 
The courts’ conflicting, perhaps even instrumental, use of 
congressional policy choices to justify divergent outcomes 
underlines the need for a coherent theory of federalism’s role in 
assessing migrants’ equal protection rights.  
V. Recalibrating Federalism’s Proper Role in Discerning Migrants’ 
Equal Protection Rights 
A. Federalism’s Place 
The respective roles of the federal and state governments in 
regulating migrants is a separate constitutional and normative 
question from what equality is due migrants once the nation 
opens its doors and those with access to the opportunity follow 
the rules of entry. In many instances, the courts have conflated 
the two314 and, in the process, undermined the antidiscrimination 
norms at the heart of equal protection. One reason for this 
development is the lack of a clear conceptual framework for how 
federalism considerations may play a legitimate role in 
discerning the constitutionality of state law distinguishing 
between citizens and lawfully present noncitizens. As a result, in 
alienage cases, federalism considerations often have a disruptive 
effect on the antidiscrimination norms of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                     
rational basis where state law was not in conflict with federal law but instead 
“mirrored” it); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 421 (5th Cir. 2005) (rational basis 
justified in part by deference to “legislative policy decisions”). 
 313. Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 77 (2012). 
 314. Judge Clifton, dissenting in Korab v. Fink, criticized the Ninth Circuit 
majority for its “confusion as to whether” it was addressing “an equal protection 
or a preemption case.” 797 F.3d 572, 605 n.7 (9th Cir. 2014) (Clifton, J., 
dissenting). He noted that the court’s equal protection analysis focused “not [on] 
whether Congress may authorize Hawaii to violate the Equal Protection Clause 
but rather ‘what constitutes such a violation when Congress has (clearly) 
expressed its will regarding a matter relating to aliens.’” Id. (quoting Soskin v. 
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2004)). Judge Clifton reasoned that 
“no equal protection doctrine . . . turns on whether ‘Congress has (clearly) 
expressed its will.’ That is instead the language of preemption analysis.” Id.  
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Amendment, transforming equal protection analysis into a 
preemption-like inquiry.315  
Federalism’s historic role in equal protection doctrine 
involving migrants examined in earlier sections of this Article 
helps to identify when federalism concerns can legitimately 
matter to the resolution of whether a sovereign has violated equal 
protection, and when federalism considerations are misplaced 
and work to displace a focus on equality. That analysis and this 
Article’s related critique of the recent equal protection 
jurisprudence involving lawfully present migrants suggests that 
in three categories—which I collectively describe as 
interpretative uses of federalism—federalism considerations can 
work within equal protection analysis without substituting a 
concern about migrants’ rights with an emphasis on 
constitutional structure.  
First, federalism does not supplant equality norms when 
courts consider whether unique powers of the state and federal 
governments warrant a presumption that government regulation 
in that area is rational and not based upon improper motives. For 
example, the Court has modulated its equal protection scrutiny in 
cases involving state political functions because of states’ Tenth 
Amendment power to regulate elections and define their political 
community.316 Similarly, in Mathews, the Court disclaimed a 
meaningful judicial role in checking the political branches’ 
decisions related to immigration policy on account of the federal 
government’s exclusive role in regulating immigration.317 In both 
                                                                                                     
 315. Supra Part IV. 
 316. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)  
Just as the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep 
for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to 
regulate elections, each State has the power to prescribe the 
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be 
chosen. Such power inheres in the State by virtue of its obligation, 
already noted above, “to preserve the basic conception of a political 
community.”  
(quotations omitted).  
 317. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976)  
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations with 
foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be 
defined in the light of changing political and economic circumstances, 
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instances, this federalism-driven deference is the result of the 
same theory: where the Constitution commits exclusive authority 
to a particular sovereign, government regulations based upon 
that authority, so the theory goes, are unlikely to be based upon 
arbitrary and improper motives.318 Courts implement the theory 
by modulating their equal protection scrutiny. 
Citing these dual exceptions, commentators have criticized 
the Court’s alienage jurisprudence as “incoherent,”319 but without 
explaining why these exceptions are incompatible with one 
another or do not employ a consistent and sound theory of 
constitutional adjudication.320 Putting aside whether the 
particular decisions in which the Court recognized these 
exceptions actually reflect regulation of a type for which the 
Court deemed deference warranted—i.e., whether Mathews’ 
alienage-based restriction on Medicare benefits in fact regulated 
immigration321 or whether states’ exclusion of lawful permanent 
residents from jobs as public school teachers and parole officers 
really addressed functions essential to a state’s political 
community322—both exceptions reflect a consistent use of 
federalism to help illuminate whether dissimilar treatment is 
justified. That is, the Court presumes that the government’s 
                                                                                                     
such decisions are frequently of a character more appropriate to 
either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary. 
 318. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978) (describing that the 
“practical consequence” of state’s power under the Tenth Amendment to define 
their political community is judicial deference to legislative choices based upon 
that authority); Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80–82 (describing the need for deference 
to decisions made pursuant to federal government’s authority over foreign 
affairs and immigration). 
 319. See Cox, supra note 10, at 352 (arguing that “[c]ourts have struggled for 
decades to develop a coherent approach to evaluating alienage rules” and have 
“for the most part . . . failed”); Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 584 (Bybee, J., 
concurring) (describing alienage jurisprudence as “unsettled” and marked by a 
“morass of conflicting approaches”).  
 320. Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 1026, 1093–94 (2003). Volokh suggests that one or two exceptions to a rule 
do not necessarily undermine its “overarching justification,” particularly when a 
core principle can still be discerned for the rule and its exceptions. Id.  
 321. Supra note 96. 
 322. See Foley, 435 U.S. at 299–300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (questioning the 
exclusion of migrants from many forms of public employment as actually serving 
the purpose of preserving states’ political community).  
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reason for distinguishing between residents is legitimate because 
of the Constitution’s structural commitment of a specific power to 
the respective government. And, in both instances, the Court 
then uses standards of review as a “legal tool” to help discern 
whether the government has complied with the Constitution’s 
substantive command of equality.323  
One may legitimately question whether modulating scrutiny 
functions accurately as a legal tool or whether courts erroneously 
have allowed too many government classifications with nuanced 
motivations within the sphere of judicial deference.324 But those 
critiques do not mean that federalism is an improper 
consideration in equal protection jurisprudence altogether. 
Indeed, federalism’s role in these instances works within equal 
protection analysis, not against it, because courts still require 
that discriminatory treatment be justified by a sufficient state 
interest. Courts’ federalism-tinged scrutiny merely operates as 
shortcut to judicial acceptance of a sufficient state interest. 
Relatedly, federalism considerations may also play an 
appropriate role in equal protection analysis when it helps reveal 
that the justification for a government regulation is arbitrary and 
improper because the state lacks authority to regulate the subject 
matter in the first place.325 This ultra vires analysis, examined 
earlier in this Article,326 is the inverse of the scrutiny-modulating 
deference described above: a government’s lacking authority to 
regulate a subject matter is a pretty good indication that its 
regulation in that area may be based upon improper motives.327 
                                                                                                     
 323. Neuman, supra note 99, at 1434–35. Gerald Neuman has challenged 
the scholarly criticism claiming that because “a classification cannot be suspect 
when the states employ it, yet non-suspect when the federal government 
employs it,” the equal protection dichotomy is flawed. Id. at 1435. Neuman 
counters that “[t]his argument erroneously treats ‘suspectness’ as an objective 
description of reality rather than a legal tool.” Id. 
 324. Criticism discussed supra note 96. 
 325. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (striking down 
alienage-based state labor restriction reasoning that courts must consider 
whether “underlying the classification is the authority to deal with that at 
which the legislation is aimed”); see also Soucek, supra note 25, at 167–71 
(describing a similar role for federalism in equal protection doctrine as “interest 
constraining” federalism in comparative analysis of alienage and marriage 
equality cases). 
 326. Supra Part III.A. 
 327. Id. A variant of this approach was also at work in Gebin v. Mineta, 231 
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Like scrutiny-modulated deference, this use of federalism also 
serves as an interpretive tool because the focus remains on 
whether discriminatory treatment is justified, not the separate 
structural concerns of supremacy, institutional competence, and 
the respective powers of the federal and state governments.  
It remains to be seen, however, the extent to which these 
interpretative uses of federalism in equal protection analysis 
remain doctrinally coherent in light of the growing influence of 
immigration federalism—a normative account of shared federal 
and state power to regulate migrants and immigration.328 For 
example, if states do, in fact, possess authority to regulate 
migrants in ways traditionally thought to be the exclusive 
domain of federal immigration regulation—as many immigration 
federalism theorists have contended,329—the basis for unitary 
deference in equal protection doctrine to an exclusively federal 
immigration power may need to be rethought.330 
But even in the absence of a reimagined equal protection 
framework that better accounts for immigration federalism—a 
project beyond this Article’s scope—the consideration of 
federalism principles in equal protection cases in the ways 
                                                                                                     
F. Supp. 2d 971 (C.D. Cal. 2002), where the district court refused to apply 
rational basis review to a provision of the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act (ATSA), enacted two months after 9/11, that barred all noncitizens from 
employment as airport screeners, reasoning that a wholesale ban on noncitizens 
from the job of airport screeners “could have no implication in our relations with 
foreign powers, nor could it be justified as encouraging aliens to naturalize.” Id. 
at 976; see also Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of 
Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1645–46 (2007) (discussing Gebin and 
concluding that “[t]he reasons behind the plenary power doctrine matter in 
determining whether a law falls within it”). 
 328. Supra note 10. 
 329. See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing immigration 
federalism scholarship); Elias, supra note 10, at 705–06 (“This ‘new immigration 
federalism’ is and will be grounded in immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking, 
which has the potential to complement (as well as occasionally contradict) 
federal efforts at comprehensive immigration reform.”). 
 330. Clare Huntington, for example, has noted that growing recognition of 
“immigration federalism”—that is, acceptance of some measure of shared power 
between federal and state governments with respect to the regulation of 
migrants—likely means an end to non-congruent equal protection in the 
immigration context, but acknowledges that what that means for individual 
rights has not yet been explored. See Huntington, supra note 11, at 838 (noting 
impact of immigration federalism on equal protection scrutiny requires “greater 
debate and exploration”). 
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described above, nevertheless, does not undermine constitutional 
equality norms. Federalism’s seemingly contradictory role in 
these instances—modulating scrutiny of the federal government’s 
regulations in one instance and the states’ in the other—merely 
recognizes, as Justice Blackmun put it, that “aliens constitute a 
unique class”: alienage status is a constitutionally relevant basis 
for distinguishing between residents in some instances, and not 
others, and often only by a specific sovereign within each 
instance.331  
Federalism concerns can also play a more direct role in equal 
protection analysis if the Supremacy Clause provides a 
compelling justification for states to distinguish between citizens 
and noncitizens. That is where Congress directs the states to 
implement a uniform federal immigration policy,332 states might 
defend challenges to a state law by claiming that the state’s 
conformance with federal law constitutes a compelling state 
interest. This approach is preferable to relaxing the strict 
scrutiny normally applicable to state alienage restrictions when 
states are purportedly following a uniform federal immigration 
policy—which is how the decisions upholding state alienage 
restrictions after PRWORA have addressed the issue.333 
Requiring the state to meet the demands of strict scrutiny, even if 
the Supremacy Clause helps to form a compelling state 
interest,334 is preferable because it will encourage courts to delve 
                                                                                                     
 331. Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 332. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(reasoning that the “federal government's imprimatur” for state alienage 
discrimination may “reduce the level of scrutiny to which the state's choice is 
subjected under the Equal Protection Clause” while acknowledging that 
Congress in PRWORA did not enact a uniform federal immigration policy and 
direct the states to follow it). 
 333. See generally, e.g., Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (2014) (applying 
rational basis review because of PRWORA); Korab v. Fink, 748 F.3d 875, 887 
(9th Cir. 2014) (applying rational basis review after concluding that Congress 
through PRWORA “has (clearly) expressed its will regarding a matter relating 
to aliens,” and Hawaii did not violate equal protection by “merely following the 
federal direction set forth by Congress” (quoting Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1254)). 
 334. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has viewed a state’s 
interest in avoiding conflicts with federal immigration law as a sufficient 
justification for alienage-based classifications, but did so while reducing the 
scrutiny otherwise required by Graham. In re Adoption of a Child by L. C., 425 
A.2d 686, 693 (N.J. 1981) (rejecting equal protection challenge to state law 
regulating birth certificates of foreign-born adoptees because “a state may deny 
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more scrupulously into the question of whether the federal 
“directive” the states purportedly were forced to comply with is 
actually a mandate or whether the states instead have 
conveniently co-opted federal immigration policy for state 
purposes.335  
Beyond its use as an interpretative tool, however, federalism 
has played another role in equal protection cases involving 
lawfully present migrants. In the new equal protection 
jurisprudence embodied by Soskin and the other recent decisions 
critiqued in this Article,336 courts privilege congressional policy as 
effectively dispositive of whether states have unconstitutionally 
discriminated, even where Congress has not dictated a uniform 
rule for states to follow. Here, federalism has a disruptive effect 
on equality norms, rendering equal protection analysis more like 
preemption doctrine. Federalism’s impact in this final area is 
cause for concern, for it could effectively preempt equal protection 
for migrants. 
B. Federalism’s Disruptive Effect 
Federalism has a disruptive effect on equal protection 
doctrine when courts treat federal law as diminishing migrants’ 
claim to equal protection before the states and congressional 
policy choices as a basis for viewing state classifications targeting 
migrants as laws drawn on the basis of non-invidious 
characteristics such as economic savings.337 Deference to 
                                                                                                     
benefits to aliens if the discrimination [] is rationally related to the state's [] 
obligation to avoid conflicts with federal law and imposes no burdens on aliens 
not anticipated by Congress”). 
 335. See, e.g., Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255 (reducing the level of scrutiny 
applicable to Colorado alienage-based restriction on public benefits even after 
acknowledging that Congress in PRWORA did not enact a uniform federal 
immigration policy and direct the states to follow it). 
 336. Supra Part IV. 
 337. See Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635, 659 (Haw. 2011) (holding 
that Connecticut’s denial of healthcare funding to immigrants was at most a 
classification “based on an individual’s eligibility for federal Medicaid” matching 
funds, and not alienage status); Bruns, 750 F.3d at 69–70 (reasoning that “if 
Maine can be said to have discriminated at all” by continuing to participate in 
the Federal Medicaid program, “it only did so on the basis of federal Medicaid 
eligibility, a benign classification subject to mere rational basis review” 
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congressional policy is misplaced and disruptive to equal 
protection norms in these instances in at least three ways.  
First, treating migrants’ status under federal immigration 
law as largely determinant of their claim to equality before the 
states sanctions class-based discrimination in matters far 
removed from immigration policy, such as fiscally motivated 
decisions regarding whether to provide migrants state-funded 
benefits338 or unproven assumptions about migrants’ reliability 
and suitability as a class for certain professional licenses.339 This 
expands the sweeping deference afforded to the federal 
government’s immigration authority, which is grounded in its 
foreign affairs power, to run-of-the-mill domestic policy decisions 
that do not warrant similar deference.340 Even worse, a state’s 
actions may receive the same deference as the federal 
government where its reasons for singling out migrants may be 
the sort of invidious class-based distinctions targeted by 
Graham—discredited assumptions about migrants’ inferior 
contributions to society and lesser claims to the benefits of 
community membership.341 
                                                                                                     
(quotation omitted)).  
 338. See Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 946 
N.E.2d 1262, 1275–76 (Mass. 2011) (recognizing that PRWORA’s alienage-based 
limitations on federal matching funds for public benefits made similar alienage-
based cuts “economically attractive to the State that is left carrying the entire 
burden”). 
 339. See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 430 (5th Cir. 2005) (Stewart, J. 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority’s reliance upon 
unproven assumption that lawfully present migrants “pose a special threat to 
the integrity of the Louisiana bar because they could be unexpectedly deported 
or they could leave and go back to their home country, leaving litigants in the 
lurch”); Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting similar 
assumptions about dangers of nonimmigrants’ “transience” with respect to their 
suitability as pharmacy professionals). 
 340. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 1439–40 (arguing that preemption 
cannot replace equal protection analysis in cases involving migrants because it 
would “permit Congress to decide how broadly aliens should be made vulnerable 
to mistreatment by the states [and] extend the extraordinary deference 
[afforded] to federal immigration policy to the . . . decisions of states and local 
governments”). 
 341. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (reasoning that 
“the ‘justification of limiting expenses is particularly inappropriate and 
unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens’” because 
“[a]liens . . . pay taxes, . . . may be called into the armed forces,” and “may live 
[and work] within a state for many years, . . . contribut[ing] to the economic 
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Second, privileging congressional policy in this way subjects 
equal protection rights to the indeterminacy of federal policy 
choices342 when the Constitution intended to remove those 
“norms from the realm of ordinary politics.”343 This is particularly 
true in the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was 
specifically intended as a restraint “on the political majority's 
political power.”344 Additionally, allowing states to immunize 
alienage-based classifications by reference to federal immigration 
policy sacrifices an important dialogue on migrants’ membership 
in state and local communities. Specifically, it insulates the 
states from having to respond to what Harold Koh has described 
as “the moral and philosophical claims that resident aliens make 
against their state governments” through equal protection 
challenges,345 thereby avoiding an important dialogue regarding 
what equality for migrants really means and states’ obligations to 
their noncitizen residents.  
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, federalism’s role in this 
category of equal protection cases is clearly inconsistent with 
Graham, which did not pin its equal protection holding upon the 
federal government’s exclusivity over immigration matters nor 
countenance a state’s attempt to frame alienage-based 
discrimination as non-invidious fiscal policy.346 To be sure, 
federalism concerns may have played less of a role in Graham’s 
equal protection analysis because, unlike in some of the Court’s 
other alienage decisions,347 Graham was also challenged under 
                                                                                                     
growth of the state”). 
 342. See Neuman, supra note 97, at 1439–40 (rejecting the notion that 
Congress should determine the states’ power to subject non-citizens to unequal 
treatment). 
 343. David R. Dow, The Equal Protection Clause and the Legislative 
Redistricting Cases—Some Notes Concerning the Standing of White Plaintiffs, 
81 MINN. L. REV. 1123, 1134–35 (1997).  
 344. Id. 
 345. See Koh, supra note 38, at 99 (arguing that “equal 
protection . . . answers” these concerns “in a way that preemption reasoning 
does not”); see also Kanstroom, supra note 42, at 461 (stating “counterintuitively 
perhaps, the contribution of noncitizens to public discourse and to the polity is 
often most effectively accomplished through the legal system”). 
 346. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 374–75 (rejecting the claim that the desire to 
preserve “the fiscal integrity” of state welfare programs may be justified by 
“invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens” (citation omitted)). 
 347. See id. at 371 (discussing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), and 
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the Supremacy Clause and included a separate holding finding 
the state laws preempted.348 The Court was thus able to separate 
its concerns about federal and state relations from its concerns 
about equality.349  
But the fact that the Court specifically considered equal 
protection to produce a forceful, landmark holding is exactly the 
point. During a formative period of equal protection 
jurisprudence, the Court unanimously decided to emphasize 
migrants’ right to equality under the Constitution, when it could 
have simply made the case a preemption decision.350 This choice 
not only had a doctrinal impact on cases involving state alienage 
restrictions in that they were decided on the basis of equal 
protection in the decade going forward, but it also carried 
important expressive significance regarding migrants’ shared 
place in the community and status as persons deserving and 
entitled to equality.351  
One might respond to the three criticisms noted above and 
contend that consideration of congressional intent in the equal 
protection context does not necessarily transform judicial review 
into a preemption case.352 That is true to the extent that, as noted 
above, courts might treat a mandatory rule of federal 
immigration policy that Congress has directed the states to follow 
as a sufficient state interest justifying a state’s alienage-based 
                                                                                                     
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)). 
 348. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377–78 (1971) (“State laws 
that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their 
alienage conflict with these overriding national policies in an area 
constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”). 
 349. See Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1107 (reasoning that Graham and its 
progeny’s equal protection analysis “obviously, depends not on institutional 
process concerns—concerns, that is, about who decides—but on substantive 
commitments to equality, and on a vision of aliens as the rightful subjects of 
equality”).  
 350. The Court, for example, chose this route in Toll v. Moreno. See 458 U.S. 
1, 17 (1982) (applying the Supremacy Clause to invalidate Maryland’s exclusion 
of nonimmigrants from in-state tuition program and avoiding a decision on 
equal protection grounds). 
 351. See generally Koh, supra note 38; Bosniak, supra note 96, at 1107. 
 352. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 583 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014) (criticizing the 
dissent for claiming that the majority’s “reference to Congress’s clearly 
expressed will demonstrates our ‘confusion as to whether this an equal 
protection or a preemption case’”).  
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classification.353 But the problem is courts have looked to 
congressional policy as dispositive of state’s equal protection 
obligations even where Congress has not directed the states to 
implement a uniform federal immigration policy.354 And in these 
cases, courts never considered whether following a 
non-mandatory federal policy would provide a compelling state 
interest to withstand strict scrutiny. Rather, they merely 
extended the deference to the federal government’s immigration 
laws to the states which opted to follow the federal government’s 
lead.355 In essence, states insulated themselves from the 
requirements of equal protection by merely referencing 
congressional policy choices as a justification for their own 
discriminatory conduct.  
This again shifts the focus from the state’s obligations under 
the Constitution to the content of congressional policy choices. It 
thereby subjugates rights within an unarticulated 
preemption-like doctrine. For each of these reasons, and to 
reaffirm lawfully present migrants’ right to equality under the 
Constitution, equal protection jurisprudence in the realm of 
migrants’ rights warrants a realignment. 
C. Fulfilling Equality’s Promise  
To resist what this Article describes as the preempting of 
equal protection for migrants requires two rather undramatic 
shifts in doctrine. First, courts must recommit to Graham’s core 
principles. This should not be difficult given that the reasons for 
treating migrants as a discrete and insular minority—their 
                                                                                                     
 353. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (recognizing that 
though states lack authority to regulate migrants “if the Federal Government 
has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for 
the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal 
direction”). 
 354. See, e.g., Soskin v. Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(rejecting the view that the “federal government's imprimatur for” state 
alienage discrimination “cannot reduce the level of scrutiny to which the state's 
choice is subjected under the Equal Protection Clause” while acknowledging 
that Congress in PRWORA did not enact a uniform federal immigration policy 
and direct the states to follow it); see also supra Part IV (discussing cases 
following Soskin’s reasoning). 
 355. Supra Part IV.  
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political vulnerability, similarity to citizens with respect to most 
state legislative judgments, and long history on the receiving end 
of state-level discrimination356—have not changed over time. In 
fact, lawfully present migrants have only become further 
integrated into the economic life of the states and deepened their 
community ties since Graham was decided.357 Lawfully present 
migrants thus remain similarly situated to their citizen 
counterparts in ways that the Supreme Court deemed 
constitutionally significant more than 40 years ago,358 and which 
the Court emphasized in subsequent decisions.359 Additionally, 
while lawfully present migrants’ status as a group that is similar 
to citizens for most state legislative purposes has not changed, 
their vulnerability due to political powerlessness has only 
deepened. This is evident in part from the rash of alienage-based 
restrictions on public benefits that many states enacted during 
                                                                                                     
 356. Supra Part II.A. 
 357. See Strength in Diversity: The Economic and Political Power of 
Immigrants, Latinos, and Asians, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (2015), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/strength-diversity-economic-and-pol 
itical-power-immigrants-latinos-and-asians (last visited Feb. 7, 2016) (describing 
economic contributions of immigrants as a class, and in particular contributions 
of immigrant-owned businesses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); David Dyssegaard Kallick, FISCAL POLICY INSTITUTE, Immigrants and 
the Economy (2009), http://www.fiscalpolicy.org/Immigrants 
In25MetroAreas_20091130.pdf (describing significant contributions of foreign 
born workers, regardless of immigration status, to a wide range of occupations 
and labor sectors). 
 358. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (citing migrants’ 
political powerlessness and emphasizing that they share burdens of community 
membership similar to citizens); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982) 
(citing Graham and noting that “[s]ome classifications are more likely than 
others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in 
pursuit of some legitimate objective”). 
 359. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) (reasoning that “[r]esident 
aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, 
and contribute in myriad other ways to our society,” such that “[i]t is 
appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden when it deprives them of 
employment opportunities”); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (explaining 
Graham’s designation of alienage as a suspect classification on grounds of 
noncitizen’s political powerlessness); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 22 (1982) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting that alienage was recognized as a 
suspect status partly to acknowledge that distinctions drawn on the basis of 
alienage-status are likely to reflect historic “antipathy” toward this minority 
group). 
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the economic downturn after the 2008 financial crisis.360 States 
facing daunting fiscal crises361 reflexively sought to preserve 
public resources by terminating coverage for a group that lacked 
the ability to respond to such polices through the electoral 
process. In short, Graham’s basic rule is just as necessary and 
defensible today as it was when the Court unanimously decided 
it.  
Second, courts must assess federalism’s potentially 
disruptive impact on equality analysis and consider federalism 
principles only as an interpretative tool in cases involving 
migrants. Courts should not be blind to the fact that the federal 
power over immigration law and migrants’ exclusion from the 
political process may impact the assessment of equal protection 
obligations in cases involving this “unique class.”362 But 
federalism should not cast so long a shadow that it transfigures 
equality analysis into a supremacy-like doctrine.  
This call for a judicial recommitment to Graham devoid of 
federalism considerations may invite skepticism, specifically the 
charge that Graham’s exceptions have essentially swallowed its 
basic rule which cannot be salvaged.363 But the existence of 
justified exceptions do not alone make otherwise defensible and 
necessary rules untenable or devoid of what Eugene Volokh has 
described as a “powerful attitude-shaping force.”364 Rather, as 
Volokh notes, the force of an original rule is particularly unlikely 
to be undone by the presence of exceptions where those 
                                                                                                     
 360. See supra Part IV (analyzing the recent decisions challenging 
alienage-based restrictions). 
 361. See Gregory T. W. Rosenberg, Alienating Aliens: Equal Protection 
Violations in the Structures of State Public-Benefit Schemes, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1417, 1417–18 (2014) (citing cases challenging states’ denial of public benefits 
“as a way of containing costs in light of budgetary pressures”). 
 362. See Toll, 458 U.S. at 22 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that 
exceptions to Graham may be “unique . . . because aliens constitute a unique 
class”); see also supra Part V.A (describing when federalism considerations 
necessarily come into play when assessing state authority in equal protection 
cases involving migrants). 
 363. See Korab v. Fink, 797 F.3d 572, 589 (9th Cir. 2014) (Bybee, J., 
concurring) (“A review of the history of alienage jurisprudence, with a particular 
review of Graham . . . suggests that it is time to rethink the doctrine.”); id. at 
585 (characterizing Graham as “riddled with exceptions and caveats that make 
consistent judicial review of alienage classifications difficult”). 
 364. Volokh, supra note 320, at 1093. 
THE PREEMPTING OF EQUAL PROTECTION 163 
exceptions fit “within some exceptional supercategory—for 
instance, cases that have been traditionally recognized as being 
outside the main principle.”365 The Mathews and political function 
exceptions represent one such instance.  
The federal government’s power to regulate immigration and 
states’ power to define their political communities are simply 
“outside” of Graham’s main principle. That principle—that the 
states may not single out migrants for unfair economic burdens 
and exclusionary policies—helps ensure that states do not impose 
opportunistic policy choices upon this group simply because of 
their inability to protest their treatment through the political 
process.366 It also helps smoke out what might otherwise exist as 
unspoken assumptions about migrants’ insufficient contributions 
to state resources and their lesser claim to community 
membership. Thus, the importance of, and justification for, such a 
rule is not undermined simply because it may also be true that 
the federal government receives great deference in its 
immigration policy decisions or that the states may exclude 
migrants from political functions and institutions.  
Critics might still contend that even if doctrinally consistent, 
Mathews and the political function cases punctured such sizeable 
holes in Graham’s main theory that its lacks any remaining 
significance. That perspective is belied, however, by Graham’s 
importance in shaping the daily lives of migrants before the 
states in a multitude of substantive and meaningful ways. 
Indeed, Graham has a role to play in ensuring lawfully present 
migrants’ equal access to employment and professional 
opportunities, healthcare benefits, drivers’ licenses, and a sense 
of membership and belonging in communities.367 Deference in 
exceptional areas of regulation affecting migrants does not dilute 
the significance of affirming lawfully present migrants’ right to 
equal treatment as workers, professionals, and people. 
                                                                                                     
 365. Id. at 1094 n.207. 
 366. This principle has an ongoing role to play to ensure that, as Plyler put 
it, states are not permitted to “impos[e] special disabilities upon groups 
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control” thereby creating “the 
kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed 
to abolish.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982). 
 367. See supra Part IV (examining the body of state and federal court 
decisions addressing these issues).  
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VI. Conclusion 
While immigration debates have recently focused 
overwhelmingly, and understandably, on unauthorized migration 
and the respective roles of the federal and state governments in 
crafting and enforcing immigration law, those important 
questions should not obscure a critical civil rights question of our 
time: how states must treat those migrants who are presented 
with the opportunity to abide by the rules of entry and now live 
within the United States. For good reason, the United States 
Supreme Court recognized decades ago that such migrants 
deserve equal treatment. It is now time to ensure that the 
federalism considerations that have preoccupied the courts in the 
intervening years do not undermine that promise. 
